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 Abstract 
 
Grid computing technologies facilitate complex scientific collaborations between 
globally dispersed parties, which make use of heterogeneous technologies and computing 
systems. However, in recent years the commercial sector has developed a growing 
interest in Grid technologies. Prominent Grid researchers have predicted Grids will grow 
into the commercial mainstream, even though its origins were in scientific research. This 
is much the same way as the Internet started as a vehicle for research collaboration 
between universities and government institutions, and grew into a technology with large 
commercial applications.  
Grids facilitate complex trust relationships between globally dispersed business 
partners, research groups, and non-profit organizations. Almost any dispersed “virtual 
organization” willing to share computing resources can make use of Grid technologies.  
Grid computing facilitates the networking of shared services; the inter-connection 
of a potentially unlimited number of computing resources within a “Grid” is possible. 
Grid technologies leverage a range of open standards and technologies to provide 
interoperability between heterogeneous computing systems. Newer Grids build on key 
capabilities of Web-Service technologies to provide easy and dynamic publishing and 
discovery of Grid resources.   
Due to the inter-organisational nature of Grid systems, there is a need to provide 
adequate security to Grid users and to Grid resources. This research proposes a 
framework, using a specific brokered pattern, which addresses several common Grid 
security challenges, which include: 
• Providing secure and consistent cross-site Authentication and 
Authorization; 
• Single-sign on capabilities to Grid users; 
Abstract 
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• Underlying platform and runtime security, and; 
• Grid network communications and messaging security. 
These Grid security challenges can be viewed as comprising two (proposed) 
logical layers of a Grid. These layers are: a Common Grid Layer (higher level Grid 
interactions), and a Local Resource Layer (Lower level technology security concerns). 
This research is concerned with providing a generic and holistic security framework to 
secure both layers. This research makes extensive use of STRIDE - an acronym for 
Microsoft approach to addressing security threats - as part of a holistic Grid security 
framework.  
STRIDE and key Grid related standards, such as Open Grid Service Architecture 
(OGSA), Web-Service Resource Framework (WS-RF), and the Globus Toolkit are used 
to formulate the proposed framework.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Grid computing has gained in popularity and application in recent years. There has 
been a growing trend towards interconnected systems both within and across 
enterprises (Foster, Kesselman, Nick, Tuecke, 2002). To date, many distributed 
computing paradigms exist, such as Common Object Request Broker Architecture 
(CORBA), Java’s’ Remote Method Invocation (RMI), Component Object Model 
(COM), Web services, etc. Grid Services are an evolution of existing paradigms 
(Foster, C. Kesselman, S. Tuecke, 2001). The use of open standards such as Open 
Grid Service Infrastructure (OGSI), extensible Mark-up Language (XML) and 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) easily allow for heterogeneous platforms to 
communicate and share computing resources within a virtual organisation (VO) 
context. 
Grids are a relatively new concept. The term Grid, in popular perception, 
has been loosely used to describe a range of concepts, anything from advanced 
networking to Artificial Intelligence. Grids are primarily concerned with 
“coordinating resource sharing and problem solving in dynamic, multi-institutional 
virtual organizations” (Foster, et al, 2001). There is often a need to integrate service 
across distributed, heterogeneous, dynamic “virtual organizations”. This sort of 
integration can be technically challenging due to the need to achieve a certain level 
of Quality-of-Service (QoS) on top of different native platforms (Foster, et al, 
2002). 
The Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) specification identifies Grid 
requirements and capabilities for building Grids. The definition of the OGSA 
specification is very closely associated with Web-service standards, such as Web-
Service Resource framework (WS-RF). Grids attempt to leverage Web service 
technologies to provide platform independent interoperable services, capitalizing on 
desired Web-service properties (Foster, et al, 2002). These desired Web service 
properties include: service description and discovery, automatic generation of client 
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and server code from service descriptions, binding of service descriptions to 
interoperable network protocols, compatibility with higher level open standards, 
services and tools, and broad commercial support (Ibid). 
OGSA Grids aim to provide open interoperable services to facilitate the 
creation and management of scalable virtual organizations. This poses some strong 
security challenges to Grid designers. Grids can often be made up of participants 
from multiple physical organizations. Grid participants might make use of 
incompatible (heterogeneous) underlying platforms and technologies, and security 
policies. 
The goal of this research is towards a holistic Grid security framework. This 
research will propose two possible abstract layers of a Grid, for this purpose, and 
focuses primarily on OGSA-based Grid systems. These layers will be defined along 
with their corresponding security challenges. 
 
1.1 Motivation For This Study 
 
1.1.1 Realization That Grid Technology Is A Rapidly Growing 
Technology 
 
Grids encompass evolving state-of-the-art technologies that will continue to have a 
large impact on the computer industry. MIT technology review (2003) has 
identified OGSA Grids as a technology that will change the world in the way that 
we do business and live our lives. Industry leaders, such as Sun Microsystems, 
Hewlett-Packard (HP), Microsoft, and Oracle, are adopting Grid technologies and 
plan on including Grid capabilities into their products. Oracle has already started 
building Grid capabilities into their commercial products (Kontzer, Whiting, 2004). 
Grid technologies have been included in their 10g family of products (Kusnetzky, 
Olofson, 2004).  
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1.1.2 Realization That There Is A Need For Interoperable, 
Standards-based Grid Security Solutions 
 
With Grid specifications constantly under modification and review, Grid security in 
particular is in need of attention. Grids are primarily a technology to facilitate 
scientific and commercial collaborations between various parties, forming virtual 
organizations (VOs). These collaborations are often over large physical distances 
and participants typically utilize heterogeneous platforms. Grid middleware 
provides a layer of interoperability on top of existing infrastructure, to support the 
integration and management of resources within VOs. These interactions across 
disparate trust domains present a number of security challenges.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Grid security continues to be a new area of research. There are currently few 
adequate Grid security solutions that address issues on all levels of (variable) Grid 
architecture. To compound the problem, Grid specifications are under constant 
review and modification. Standardised Grid security practices and specifications are 
still lacking. This is largely since current solutions are adapted to Grids which 
evolve from pre-existing infrastructure, rather then being specifically designed for 
“generic” Grid requirements. Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) is a “generic” 
Globus specification which will be re-visited in subsequent chapters, but 
encompasses inherent problems. Grid security challenges are divided into two 
distinct categories: political (inter-organisational) issues, and technology (Grid 
fabric) issues. 
Higher level (political) issues stem from Grids operating across 
organizational and administrative domains. Grids need to provide coherent and 
adequate authentication, authorization, and to facilitate complex trust relationships 
across these various domains. This is a challenging task, considering participants 
abide by conflicting, or incompatible policies.  
Lower level Grid security is concerned with securing Grid resources. These 
are the resources that collectively make up a Virtual Organisation (VO). Grids do 
not prescribe standard underlying hardware or software. Although Grid resource 
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threats can be identified, no standard solution can be recommended that will be 
relevant to all Grid implementations (due to the diverse nature of Grid resources). 
Standard guidelines are needed to address these security concerns. These guidelines 
need to have relevance to all Grid implementations. 
This research will attempt to define a holistic framework to secure OGSA-
based Grids. Both political and lower level Grid security concerns will be discussed 
and addressed. To successfully define such a framework, the following research 
questions need to be answered initially (mainly, but not solely, from a security 
perspective): 
• What is a Grid? 
• How do Grids differ from other distributed computing paradigms? 
• What are the Grid requirements and capabilities defined in the OGSA 
specification? 
• How do current versions of the Globus toolkit factor in OGSA 
requirements and capabilities? 
• What technologies enable interoperable Grid messaging? 
 
1.3 Objectives Of This Study 
 
The primary objective of this research is to propose a framework towards holistic 
Grid security. The framework is intended to address both higher level political 
issues and lower level technological issues.  To achieve this objective, the 
following sub-objectives have, among others, been pre-empted: 
• A generic method for identifying Grid resource threats must be defined. 
This method must be applicable to a wide range of hardware and 
software configurations. Relevant countermeasures to Grid threats must 
be identified. 
• A single political-level authority to facilitate authentication, 
authorization, and trust relationships between Grid participants must be 
defined. 
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1.4 Methodology 
 
The primary methodology that will be utilized during this study is scientific 
argument (roughly based on the phenomenological approach), underpinned by a 
comprehensive literature survey. The literature survey will examine the current 
Grid landscape by examining relevant work published in the domain of discourse. 
The nature of Grids, as espoused in Grid specifications and supporting standards, 
will be examined. This, together with previous research will be used to find critical 
success factors which define a holistic Grid security framework. 
Early reading in the field indicates that one can distinguish two layers of 
security challenges that exist in the Grid environment. An approach to address the 
political Grid security challenges, which allows for diverse fabric-level 
implementations, will be identified. Also, a generic threat model will be defined. 
The literature survey will include a discussion on how this model must be generic 
enough to be applicable to the heterogeneous nature of Grid resource 
implementations, but must take Grid specific constraints into account.  
The results of this study have been reported both in this dissertation and an 
academic paper.  
 
1.5 Overview Of The Dissertation 
 
The proposed layout of the dissertation is depicted in figure 1.1. The dissertation 
consists of eight chapters. 
Chapter 1 provides introductory information on the problem area of the 
dissertation. 
Chapter 2 aims to introduce the salient concepts of Grids. The chapter 
compares common distributed commuting technologies to Grids, and highlights the 
differences between them. 
Chapter 3 discusses the Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) and the 
Globus toolkit. It discusses the OGSA 1.5 specification in detail, highlighting 
relevant sections of the specification. The Globus toolkit is also discussed in some 
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detail. The Globus toolkit is based on OGSA. This chapter will discuss how Globus 
implements the OGSA specification 
Chapter 4 discusses concepts and technologies that support OGSA-based 
Grids. Grids are based on a Web-service Service Orientated Architecture (SOA). 
SOA is highlighted and discussed with relevance to Grids. Supporting Web-service 
technologies such as Web-service Resource framework (WS-RF), Web-service 
Description Language (WSDL), Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) are also 
discussed. 
Chapter 5 discusses the need for Grid security. STRIDE, as a threat 
classification scheme, is introduced and discussed. This chapter proposes two 
logical layers of a Grid, based on the Grid security requirements. Security concerns 
in these layers are addressed in chapter 6 and 7.  
Chapter 6 defines a broker entity to facilitate high level Grid security 
challenges. The broker is defined is an abstract high level software component. The 
broker addresses the ‘political’ security issued identified. 
Chapter 7 discusses a generic threat-modeling methodology in terms of the 
generic steps taken by an attacker (from a Grids perspective). This chapter outlines 
a generic threat-modelling process that can be applied to almost all Grid resource 
implementations.  
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation. 
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Figure 1.1: Proposed layout of the dissertation 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Grid 
 
In recent years the concept of Grid computing has gained in popularity. Grids allow 
for large scale collaboration between dispersed parities, which typically make use 
of heterogeneous platforms and technologies. The term “Grid” has been largely 
misrepresented. To fully understand the capabilities and benefits of utilizing Grid 
technologies, one must have a clear understanding of what Grids are, what Grids 
clearly are not, and what the goal of Grid computing is.   
The following is an early definition of Grid computing, “A computational 
Grid is a hardware and software infrastructure that provides dependable, consistent, 
pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-end computational capabilities.” (Foster, 
Kesselman, 1998; Berman, Fox, Hey, 2003). Recent research in the Grid area has 
identified several newer layers, on top of the hardware and software layers 
identified in earlier Grid definitions. A Grid might not be limited to a single 
physical organization and administrative body; thus, new challenges are introduced. 
Grids can be applied to inter-organizational collaborations, know as virtual 
organizations. There are social and policy issues to be considered within cross-
organizational Grid implementations, above the technical layers required to make 
Grids work.  
The goal of Grid technologies is, “to coordinate resource sharing and 
problem solving in dynamic, multi-institutional virtual organizations” (Foster, et al, 
2001). Although the primary goal of Grids is to promote multi-institutional 
collaborations in a virtual organization, this is not the exclusive application of Grid 
computing. Grid computing concepts can be applied within single organizations as 
well. Organizations might want to couple arrays of network nodes together to 
provide powerful computing structures, or create powerful knowledge-bases 
utilizing Grid enabled technologies. The key Grid concept, is the ability to negotiate 
resource-sharing arrangements among a set of participating parties (providers and 
consumers), and then to use the resulting resource pool for some common purpose 
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(Foster, 2002). Grids need to be able to facilitate these requirements on top of 
heterogeneous hardware and software platforms (provide interoperability). 
According to Foster, a Grid should be evaluated in terms of its applications, 
business value, and scientific results it delivers, not its architecture (Ibid).  
There are common misconceptions around what constitutes a Grid. Peer-to-
peer (P2P) networks and clustering, for example are technologies that have similar 
goals, but are different in focus of design, requirements and communities (Foster, 
Iamnitchi, 2003).  
The next three sub-sections are intended to clarify the Grid concept.  
 
2.1 What Is The Grid?  
 
Goble makes the analogy of a computational Grid to a power Grid (electrical Grid), 
“computing and data resources would be delivered over the Internet seamlessly, 
transparently and dynamically as and when needed, just like electricity” (Goble, De 
Roure, 2002). The Grid technologies aim to provide seamless and consistent 
resource publishing, discovery, and access, across heterogeneous hardware and 
software environments. 
 A Grid provides resource sharing and collaboration capabilities to dispersed 
parties participating in a virtual organization context. In order for Grids to function 
as they are intended to, Grids require protocols (and interfaces and policies) that are 
not only open and general-purpose but also standard (Foster, 2002). Foster defines a 
three point checklist as to what a Grid is: 
1. Coordinates resource sharing that is not subject to centralized control 
2. Using standard, open, general purpose protocols and interfaces 
3. To deliver non-trivial Quality-of-Service 
According to Foster, “the Grid is not a monolithic client-server structure...” 
and “…a primary characteristic of Grids is to not be subject to central control” 
(Ibid). However, some form of central control is necessary to achieve coordinated 
resource sharing. A Grid can be deployed over several sites worldwide, making use 
of incompatible underpinning technologies, such as platform and security 
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technologies. It will be argued in this dissertation that there is a need to provide 
some method of “central” control in the form of a broker (discussed in chapter 6), 
although its control is not absolute. A broker in a Grid context acts as a mediator 
between Grid participants, and facilitates communication through open standards 
and middleware. Standardization is one of the key aspects to Grid computing:  
• “It is standards that allow one to establish resource-sharing 
arrangements dynamically with any interested party and thus to create 
something more than a plethora of balkanized, incompatible, non-
interoperable distributed systems” (Ibid).  
Efforts have been made by the Global Grid Forum (GGF) and other 
interested parties to provide standards for Grid implementations. The Open Grid 
Service Architecture (OGSA) is a widely accepted specification for defining the 
Grid capabilities required by Grid middleware. Grid middleware is a term to 
describe the tools and APIs necessary to facilitate Grids, i.e. the software layer 
needed to provide interoperability among heterogeneous platforms. OGSA is a 
constantly evolving specification. The Globus toolkit, currently in its fourth 
revision (GT4), is an open-source toolkit, based on the OGSA specification. The 
GT4 contains tools and services for implementing Grids and Grid resources. 
OGSA prescribes the WS-* set of Web-service standards, for publishing 
services and service discovery. The Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) builds 
on Grid and Web-service concepts, to provide a set of standard capabilities for 
publishing Grid resources. OGSA defines standard mechanisms for creating, 
naming, and discovering transient Grid resource instances; furthermore, it provides 
location transparency and multiple protocol bindings for service instances; and 
supports integration with underlying native platform facilities (Foster, Kesselman, 
Nick, Tuecke, 2002b). 
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2.2 The Goal Of Grid Computing 
 
The Grid computing concept is an evolution of traditional distributed computing 
paradigms. Grids have a focus on large-scale resource sharing, innovative 
applications, and, in some cases, high-performance orientation. Foster identifies the 
goal of Grid computing as, “the real and specific problem that underlies the Grid 
concept is coordinated resource sharing and problem solving in dynamic, multi-
institutional virtual organizations” (Foster, et al, 2001). Current Internet 
technologies primarily address communication and uniform information exchange 
between computers, but do not adequately facilitate the coordinated use of 
resources available at multiple co-operating sites. Grids facilitate the creation of 
dynamic sharing relationships between any potential participants. Grid participants 
do not make use of a prescribed set of hardware and software; so, many Grid 
participants utilize heterogeneous platforms. Thus, interoperability is a central issue 
that Grids need to address. 
Grid concepts and technologies were initially developed to establish 
resource sharing within scientific collaborations (Foster, et al, 2002). In recent 
years there has been a growing trend towards commercial applications for Grids as 
well, just as the Internet World Wide Web (WWW) began as a technology for 
scientific collaborations and was later adopted for commercial mainstream use. The 
same is expected for Grid applications (Ibid). Grid technologies are also concerned 
with providing resource sharing, and harnessing existing resources and 
infrastructure to satisfy new, emerging business needs within single organisations. 
With the emergence of the Internet as a business tool, there has been a growing 
realization that companies’ IT infrastructure also encompasses external networks, 
resources, and services (Ibid).  
Grid systems aim to integrate, virtualize, and manage services and 
resources, within distributed, heterogeneous virtual organizations (Foster, Savva, 
Berry, Djaoui, Grimshaw, Maciel, Siebenlist, Subramaniam, Treadwell, Von Reich, 
2006). The Grid paradigm faces many challenges including: authentication, 
authorization, resource access, resource discovery, etc, within a virtual 
organization. Individual (or physical) organizations that are included or have 
Chapter 2: The Grid 
 12
membership to a collaborating virtual organization often have diverse security 
infrastructure and security policies. There is a need for higher-level (abstracted) 
services to provide interoperability among diverse participants.  
Grids provide this interoperability by utilizing middleware. Middleware is 
defined as, “the services needed to support a common set of applications in a 
distributed network environment” (Aiken, Strassner, Carpenter, Foster, Lynch, 
Mambretti, Moore, Teitelbaum, 2000). Grid middleware is intended to be easily 
implemented and complementary to existing network infrastructure and services 
within the adopted organization, or organizations participating in a virtual 
organization context. Grid middleware enables proxies for standardized 
communication channels between participants in a Grid, but this occurs on a local 
(fabric) level. Grid political-level requirements include that resources be: 
discovered, accessed, allocated, accounted for, etc. In general, all these entities 
need to be managed as a single virtual system. This should be possible, even when 
the hardware\software infrastructure is provided by different vendors and/or 
managed by different organizations. Standardization is crucial for the creation of 
interoperable, portable, and reusable Grids. The same applies to Grid security 
considerations; a political-level brokered architecture will be argued for in this 
study. 
To summarize, the primary goal of Grid systems is to facilitate resource 
sharing in a large collaboration of diverse parties. The standardization of protocols 
and services is required to support secure Grid: authentication, authorization, 
service discovery, and service publishing, in diverse heterogeneous environments. 
Just as the World Wide Web (WWW) and other earlier network technologies were 
originally utilized purely for scientific collaborations, and later adopted for 
commercial gain, the same is expected to occur with Grid technologies.  
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2.3 How The Grid Differs From Similar Existing 
Paradigms 
 
The previous section described what a Grid is, and what the goals of Grid 
technology are. This section will compare other prominent modern 
resource\information sharing technologies to the Grid. Several technologies will be 
identified. Their differences and similarities to Grids will be discussed.  
The following elements of a Grid have been identified, and were discovered 
to be crucial and in a combination unique to Grid systems: 
• Coordinated resource sharing 
• Not subject to centralized control 
• Utilizing open, general purpose protocols 
• Delivers a non-trivial Quality of Service 
• Interoperable among diverse platforms and technologies 
• Provides adequate security services 
The above mentioned criteria for a Grid will be compared to the following 
resource\information sharing technologies. This will establish that existing 
technologies in current widespread adoption cannot fully satisfy all the Grid 
requirements (Foster, et al, 2001; Foster, et al, 2003).  
1) World Wide Web (WWW) 
2) Third-party service providers 
3) Enterprise computing systems 
4) Internet and peer-to-peer (P2P) 
 
2.3.1 World Wide Web (WWW) 
 
The World Wide Web (WWW) is a powerful tool for sharing information. The 
WWW is built on rich technologies for sharing information. The efforts made by 
the IETF and W3C have seen the rise of standards and protocols, which make the 
WWW an attractive platform for constructing virtual organization systems and 
applications. These technologies include HTTP, HTML, TCP\IP, and XML. 
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These technologies are excellent at supporting client-browser to Web-server 
interactions. However, on their own, they lack the richer interaction capabilities 
required for modern virtual organizations. For instance, Web content is generally 
subject to centralized control, following a client-server interaction model. 
   
2.3.2 Third-party Service Providers 
 
Third-party service providers typically provide outsourced IT services, such as 
specialized business applications and storage capabilities, among others. 
Interactions between third-party providers and clients are often an on-request, 
client-server interaction. There is generally a pre-established service level 
agreement (SLA) between the provider and client, defining the access to hardware 
and service combinations. 
From the perspective of a virtual organization, third-party service providers 
provide building blocks for a VO. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and static 
configurations are inherent to the type of relationship that exits with a third-party 
service provider. This makes a coherent VO resource sharing model hard to 
achieve.  
The static nature of third-party utilities makes it difficult, almost impossible 
to create smart, Grid-enabled applications; for example, if there is a dataset stored 
on a storage service provider (SSP) site, and an application hosted at an application 
service provider (ASP) site. The application hosted at the ASP will not dynamically 
learn of the dataset, its content, or the security requirements to access it. 
The integration of Grid technologies into third-party services, provided by 
storage service providers (SSP) and application service providers (ASP), could 
provide a richer range of services to organizations. Third-party services alone are 
merely building blocks for a virtual organization.  
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2.3.3 Enterprise Computing Systems  
 
Enterprise development technologies such as Common Object Request Broker 
(CORBA), Enterprise Java Beans, Java 2 Enterprise Edition (J2EE), and 
Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM), are all paradigms available to 
create distributed enterprise applications. These paradigms provide: resource 
interfaces, remote method invocation mechanisms, service publishing and service 
discovery. These services make it easy to share resources within a single 
organization but require pre-agreement for inter-organisational interactions. 
Enterprise computing systems provide resource sharing; however, they do 
not satisfy Grid requirements. Enterprise computing systems are relatively static 
and are restricted to occur within a single organization. Their primary form of 
interaction is typically client-server, rather then the coordinated use of multiple 
resources. 
 
2.3.4 Internet And Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
 
Grids  and  Peer-to-Peer (P2P)  are  both  concerned  with  the  pooling  and  
coordinated  use  of  resources  within distributed communities (Foster, et al, 2003). 
Grids and P2P technologies share similar end goals. However, there are some 
fundamental differences in their implementations and application. 
Grids are concerned with providing a rich set of resources, to restricted 
communities, delivering non-trivial Quality-of-Service to its users. Peer-to-Peer, 
however, provides a small set of services, to a wider user base, with out any real 
concern for Quality-of-Service (QoS), delivery and trust. The following table 
illustrates some of the differences between Grids and P2P: 
 
Table 2.1: P2P and Grid comparison 
 Grids P2P 
Community base Smaller Larger 
QoS concerns Yes No 
Services provided Rich set Basic 
Trust between participants High amount required No Concern 
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter addressed the fundamentals of Grid technologies. It sought to 
demonstrate the goal of Grid computing and how the Grid paradigm differs from 
other existing technologies for sharing resources and providing interaction beyond 
the single enterprise. 
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Chapter 3 
 
OGSA and The Globus Toolkit 
 
Chapter 2 introduced the concept of Grids for implementing resource sharing, and 
distributed systems across organizational boundaries, thereby forming virtual 
organizations (VOs). Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) is a specification 
aimed at standardizing the Grid paradigm (Foster, et al, 2006). The OGSA 
specification (version 1.5) will be used as a basis for the discussion in this chapter. 
The Globus Toolkit (GT4; version 4), an open community project implementing 
many of the requirements and capabilities defined by OGSA, will be discussed as 
well. 
The Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) is a Service Orientated 
Architecture (SOA). SOA will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. In chapter 
2, it was highlighted that standardization is the key to allowing heterogeneous 
systems to be discovered, accessed, monitored, and managed as a single, virtual 
system. OGSA builds on technologies from both the Grid and Web-service 
communities. Technologies form the Web-service community allow Grid designers 
to make use of standardized, platform independent interfaces for building Grids on 
a variety of native operating system platforms. The definition of the OGSA 
specification is closely tied to the WS-* set of specifications. WS-* are a set of 
specifications for implementing service orientated Web-services. The particular 
WS-* specification of interest to this research is the WS-Resource Framework 
(WS-RF), which will be discussed in chapter 4. 
The OGSA specification is divided into two main sections, OGSA 
requirements and OGSA capabilities. The specification provides a set of abstract 
requirements that OGSA is intended to address. These requirements are translated 
into a set of capabilities that collectively define OGSA (Foster, et al, 2006). 
The capabilities defined by OGSA are implemented in an open source 
project called Globus. The Globus Toolkit is a set of services and components for 
implementing OGSA compatible Grids. The Toolkit is currently in its fourth 
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version. Globus is the de facto standard for Grid implementations (Gerndt, 2004). 
Security is implemented in the Globus Security Infrastructure (GSI); this 
component of the Globus Toolkit is of particular interest to this research as it is one 
of the few practical implementations of a Grid security infrastructure. GSI makes 
use of X.509 certificates to authenticate and authorize parties within a Grid context 
(X.509 is discussed in Chapter 7). 
The following sections will provide detailed discussions of the OGSA 
requirements and capabilities, and a brief discussion on how Globus implements 
OGSA capabilities. WS-RF will be briefly discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
3.1 OGSA Requirements 
 
OGSA requirements are driven by a set of functional and non-functional 
requirements. These requirements are largely based on use cases identified in the 
OGSA specification (Foster, et al, 2006). The following table provides a list of the 
OGSA requirements and a brief summary of each requirement (Ibid): 
 
Table 3.1: A brief summary of OGSA requirements 
OGSA requirement Summary 
 
1. Interoperability and support for 
dynamic heterogeneous 
environments  
OGSA must provide interoperability between 
such diverse, heterogeneous, distributed 
resources and services, as well as reducing the 
complexity of administering heterogeneous 
systems. 
2. Resource sharing across 
organizations 
One of the main goals of OGSA is to enable 
resource sharing and virtualization across 
administrative domains 
3. Optimization Optimization refers to the technique used to 
allocated resources effectively to meet consumer 
(client side) and supplier (server side) needs.  
4. Quality-of-Service assurance Services and Grid resources must provide clients 
with the agreed upon Quality-of-Service 
5. Job execution OSGA must provide manageability for execution 
of user defined tasks throughout out their lifetime
6. Data services OGSA must provide efficient access to large 
datasets, as well as the abilities to move them 
between Grid participants 
7. Security services Safe administration of distributed resources, 
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requires controlling access to resources through 
secure and robust security protocols 
8. Administrative cost reduction Consistent and automated management 
operations are required, in order to minimize cost 
and the possibility of human error 
9. Scalability The large scale nature of Grid systems might put 
novel demands on the management 
infrastructure, the management architecture 
needs to be able to scale with the growth of the 
Grid 
10. Availability Disaster recovery mechanisms are needed to 
ensure the operation of a Grid system can be 
recovered quickly and efficiently in case of 
natural or human-caused disaster 
11. Ease of use and extensibility OGSA enabled Grids should mask the 
complexity of the environment from its users 
 
The following sub sections will discuss these requirements in more detail. 
 
3.1.1 Interoperability and Support For Heterogeneous   
Environments 
 
Grid environments are often large and dynamic, encompassing heterogeneous and 
largely distributed parties. Grid participants make use of a variety of hosting 
platforms (.NET, JAVA, etc), operating systems (Windows, LINUX, UNIX, etc), 
devices, and services. Grids are intended to be long-lived and dynamic, and could 
possibly evolve past the original design specification.    
OGSA is required to cater for these scenarios. It must provide 
interoperability between these dynamic, heterogeneous, and largely dispersed 
parties; while reducing the complexity of managing such environments. 
The following requirements to support heterogeneous systems are defined in 
the OSGA version 1.5 specification (Foster, et al, 2006): 
• Resource virtualization – Resource virtualization is essential to reduce the 
complexity of managing heterogeneous and diverse systems, and to handle 
diverse resources in a unified way. 
• Common management capabilities – Common management methods are 
required to simplify management of heterogeneous systems. Uniform and 
consistent management methods are required. 
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• Resource discovery and query – Mechanisms within OGSA are required 
for identifying resources with capabilities required by Grid users. 
• Standard protocols and schemes - Standard protocols are requirements for 
interoperability. 
 
3.1.2 Resource Sharing Across Organizations 
 
Grids are not a monolithic system, but often consist of resources owned by multiple 
organizations (Foster, et al, 2006). OGSA must be able to support resource sharing 
across administrative domains, even across organizational boundaries. Cross-
organizational resource sharing requirements include (Ibid): 
• Global namespace – Global namespaces allow for simplified data and 
resource access. Global namespaces provide unique identification for Grid 
participants.  
• Metadata service – Metadata services are required for finding, invoking 
and tracking entities. Metadata services are required to provide information 
about Grid entities and their current state. 
• Site autonomy - Resources must be accessible across sites. However, local 
control and policy must still be respected.  
• Resource usage data - Standard mechanisms for collecting and 
distributing resource usage information across organizations, for the 
purpose of accounting, billing, etc is required. 
  
3.1.3 Optimization 
 
Optimization as defined in the OGSA specification is as follows, “Optimization 
refers to techniques used to allocate resources effectively to meet consumer and 
supplier requirements” (Foster, et al, 2006). OGSA must make optimization 
considerations for both consumers and suppliers participating in a Grid. The OGSA 
specification refers to consumers as a ‘client’ or service requestor, while a supplier 
is referred to as a service provider. An example of optimization would be client-
side caching of data to improve network performance. 
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3.1.4 Quality-of-Service Assurance 
 
Grid resources must provide an agreed-upon Quality-of-Service (QoS) between 
Grid consumers and suppliers. OGSA defines key QoS dimensions, such as 
availability, security and performance. QoS expectations must be expressed using 
measurable and commonly understood terms.  OGSA QoS assurance requirements 
include (Foster, et al, 2006): 
• Service level agreements - QoS should be represented as an agreement 
between provider and requester, prior to service execution. Standard 
mechanisms should be provides to create and manage QoS agreements. 
• Service level attainment – Mechanisms must be provided to ensure 
attainment of agreed upon service level agreements between Grid resource 
consumers and suppliers. 
• Migration - It should be possible to migrate executing services or 
applications to adjust workloads for performance or availability. 
 
3.1.5 Job Execution 
 
OGSA must provide flexibility and manageability for executing user defined jobs 
(processes), thought out the lifetime of the job. Furthermore, functions such as 
scheduling, provisioning, job control and exception handing of jobs must be 
supported thought out the processes lifetime; even if the process is distributed 
across heterogeneous resources. OGSA defined job execution requirements (Foster, 
et al, 2006): 
• Support for various types of jobs - Executions of various types of jobs 
must be supported including simple and complex jobs, such as workflow 
and composite services. 
• Job management - It is important to be able to manage jobs during their 
entire lifetime. Jobs must support manageability interfaces and must work 
with various types of groupings of jobs. 
• Scheduling - The ability to schedule and execute jobs based on priority, and 
current resource allocation (capacity) is required. 
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• Resource provisioning - Measures need to be put in place to automate the 
process of resource allocation, deployment and configuration. 
 
3.1.6 Data services 
 
Data services must provide efficient access to distributed datasets, and the ability to 
move and manage them. OGSA must simplify the creation of data-orientated 
applications, and make them resilient to changes in the Grid environment (Foster, et 
al, 2006). OGSA defines the following data service requirements (Ibid): 
• Policy and specification management - Policies are required to define how 
the data is accessed and managed in a Grid environment. 
• Data storage - Storage for Grid data is required; the most typical form of 
storage are hard disk drives. Common interfaces provide common storage 
and management. 
• Data access - Easy and effective access to various types of data (database, 
file, and streams), independent of its physical location or platform, by 
abstracting underlying data sources, is required. 
• Data transfer - High bandwidth data transfer is required. This requirement 
is an infrastructure requirement. High speed networks and redundant 
network paths are required. Redundant network paths provide load 
balancing when the infrastructure is under strain. 
• Data location management - These services manage where data is 
physically stored.  
• Data update - Grids must provide updated facilities that maintain 
consistency of updated datasets. These services must ensure the data is 
correct, consistent and up-to-date. 
• Data persistency – All data and metadata should be maintained for the 
entire lifetime of the Grid user request.  
• Data federation - Federation of data across heterogeneous environments 
should be supported. Heterogeneous data might be organized in different 
schemes, or stored using different technologies. Mechanisms to convert and 
federate data interactions between heterogeneous platforms are required. 
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3.1.7 Security Services 
 
Standard and secure mechanisms are required to secure Grid interactions. Grids 
need to support safe resource-sharing across different administration domains. 
OGSA defines standard security requirements (Foster, et al, 2006): 
• Authentication and Authorization - Authentication is required to 
identify individuals and services within the Grid. Consistent 
authorization assertions are required to be consistent throughout all 
layers of the Grid. 
• Multiple security infrastructures - Distributed operations imply the 
need to integrate multiple security infrastructures. OGSA must be able 
to integrate and be interoperable with existing security architectures and 
models. 
• Perimeter security solutions - Resources may be accessed across 
organizational boundaries. OGSA requires standard and secure 
mechanisms that can protect organizations, and yet allow for secure 
cross organizational collaboration. 
• Delegation – User rights must be delegate-able to user processes. A 
process should be able to utilize resources on behalf of the user 
executing the process. 
• Security policy exchange - Service requestors and providers should be 
able to dynamically share policy information, to allow the establishment 
of a negotiated security context between them. 
• Intrusion detection, protection, and secure logging - Strong 
monitoring of intrusions and misuse is required in order to help mitigate 
security incidents. 
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3.1.8 Administrative Cost Reduction 
 
There are high financial costs, and an increased possibility of human error when 
administering large scale complex distributed environments. OGSA automates 
standard administrative tasks for Grid administrators. OGSA defines the three 
following methods for reducing the administrative costs associated with Grids 
(Foster, et al, 2006): 
• Policy based management – Grid administration could be automated at 
all layers of the Grid. This includes low level technology policies, to 
higher level process policies. 
• Application contents management - Application contents management 
can allow for the deployment, configuration and maintenance of 
complex systems. This approach will allow for concise and reliable 
management of components, without expert knowledge of the 
applications. 
• Problem determination (troubleshooting) - Troubleshooting 
mechanisms are required, so administrators can quickly recognize, cope 
with and fix emergencies. 
 
3.1.9 Scalability 
 
The large scale distributed nature of a Grid could put strain on the management 
infrastructure. The management architecture needs to scale to potentially support 
thousands of heterogeneous resources.  
 
3.1.10 Availability 
 
A high level of availability is a requirement in high performance Grid 
environments. A high level of availability can be achieved through fault tolerant 
hardware. In the case of data loss or services loss, disaster recovery mechanisms 
can be employed to ensure speedy service continuation. 
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3.1.11 Ease Of Use and Extensibility 
 
OGSA should mask the complexity of the environment from its users (Foster, et al, 
2006). The Grid must provide extensibility and customization in a way that does 
not compromise interoperability.  
 
3.2 OGSA Capabilities  
 
The following section will discuss the OGSA capabilities as they are represented in 
the OGSA specification version 1.5 (Foster, et al, 2006). Version 1.5 of the 
specification was the latest version at the time this document was authored. OGSA 
capabilities define a set of services to address the requirements outlined in the 
document. These requirements were discussed in the previous section. 
OGSA defines a set of capabilities that allow for the seamless use and 
management of distributed heterogeneous resources. OGSA defines three logical 
tiers to a Grid, these tiers are as follows: 
• base resources (bottom tier) 
• virtualization and abstraction (middle tier) 
• applications (top tier) 
Base resources are supporting underlying resources. These resources could 
be logical or physical resources, which have relevance outside OGSA. These 
resources include hardware (CPU, memory, disk space), or OS processes, etc. and 
are often referred to as the Grid fabric. According to Foster, “This layer (resource 
tier) provides the resources to which shared access is mediated by Grid protocols” 
(Foster, et al, 2006). 
The virtualization and abstraction tier is made up of Grid middleware that 
facilitates the interactions between Grid participants. This tier implements OGSA 
capabilities and services. These capabilities support applications and processes, on 
the highest level of the Grid architecture. A detailed relationship between the 
middle tier and lower tier (or base resource level) exists. 
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The applications layer is a logical representation of applications and 
processes. This tier builds on the two lower tiers to realize user and domain 
orientated processes and functionality (such as business processes). 
OGSA services and capabilities are mostly realized in the ‘virtualization and 
abstraction’ tier, or middle tier. The following sections will discuss the services and 
capabilities required by OGSA to facilitate the creation, use and management of 
Grid resources in a virtual organization context. 
 
3.2.1 Infrastructure Services 
 
OGSA shares and builds on a number of common services. Current work on OGSA 
builds on, and contributes to, the growing set of Web-service architecture standards. 
The WS-* set of standards provide OGSA Grids with a robust service orientated 
architecture, in particular the Web-service resource framework (WS-RF). 
According to the OGSA specification, “Web-services Architecture is the most 
effective route to follow to achieve a broadly adopted, industry-standard service-
oriented rendering of the functionality required for Grid systems” (Foster, et al, 
2006).  
Web-service standards utilized in conjunction with OGSA, allow OGSA to 
provide a service-orientated architecture. Web Service Description Language 
(WSDL) is used to define service interfaces (Christensen, 2001), and Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP) is utilized as the primary message exchange format 
between OGSA resources. SOAP is a lightweight protocol intended for exchanging 
structured information in a decentralized, distributed environment (Gudgin, Hadley, 
Mendelsohn, Moreau, Nielsen, 2003). Both SOAP and WSDL are discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
The combination of these technologies provides a foundation for building 
complex Grid resources. Grid resources are consumable by a variety of software 
and hardware platforms. These technologies promote interoperability in large, 
widely dispersed, heterogeneous Grids. 
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3.2.2 Execution Management Services (EMS) 
 
Execution Management Services (EMS) is primarily concerned with executing and 
managing units of work, until the completion of the job. OGSA specification 
defines units of work as follows, “units of work may include either OGSA 
applications or legacy (non-OGSA) applications (a database server, a servlet 
running in a Java application server container, etc)” (Foster, et al, 2006). OGSA 
defines the following objectives of Execution Management Services (Ibid): 
• EMS must, find execution candidate locations, 
• select execution candidate locations, 
• prepare execution, 
• initiate execution, and 
• manage executions for the duration of their lifetime. 
 
3.2.3 Data Services 
 
OGSA data services provide the capabilities necessary to move and manage data as 
required in a Grid environment. Data services are accessible by other OGSA 
defined services that require access to data. All direct interactions with data are 
handled by the OGSA data services. Data services are able to interpret and store 
data in different formats. Due to the heterogeneous nature of Grids there are no 
standard methods of storing data. Some examples of possible data resources 
available in Grids include: flat files, streams, a variety of Database Management 
Systems (DBMSs), data catalogues or directories. 
 
3.2.4 Resource Management Services  
 
Grid Resource Management Services manage Grid resources. There are three types 
of resource management in Grids. OGSA defines them as follows (Foster, et al, 
2006): 
• Management of the underlying resources (Grid fabric), 
• Management of OGSA Grid resources, and 
• Management of the OGSA infrastructure (Grid middleware). 
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3.2.5 Security Services 
 
Grids potentially cross administrative domains. Foster defines broad Grid security 
requirements as follows: 
• “OGSA security architectures must support, integrate, and unify popular 
security models, mechanisms, protocols, platforms, and technologies in a 
way that enables a variety of systems to interoperate securely” (Foster, et al, 
2006).  
OGSA security models must be able to plug into and be compatible, with a 
wide range of security architectures and models across a wide range of hosting 
platforms and operating systems. Single organizational domains within a virtual 
organization tend to implement their own local security policies to achieve their 
individual business goals. These security policies could vary in implementation and 
strictness. All interactions between parties in a Grid are subject to Grid security 
policies, and the local security policies of interacting participants. 
Grids security services facilitate the enforcement of policy-based security 
architecture. The enforcement of policy-based security is to ensure the higher level 
business objectives are met. Grids must provide the following security services: 
authentication, identity mapping, authorization, credential conversation, audit and 
secure logging, and privacy (Foster, et al, 2006). Many of these security 
requirements are addressed in the framework proposed by this research.  
  
3.2.6 Self Management Services 
 
Self management is a concept that reduces the cost and complexity of maintaining 
large IT infrastructure. Self managing environments allow for components, 
hardware and software, to troubleshoot themselves. These components can identify 
faults and correct their configuration; or notify administrators of a problem, 
allowing them to solve it problem proactively. OGSA defines a set of self 
management service, but also indicates that not all participants and resources will 
make use of all or any of the defined services.  
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3.2.7 Information Services 
 
Information services stores metadata about Grid resources. These services allow 
Grid users and services to access and manipulate information about Grid resources. 
Information services provide a directory of static Grid resource information, and 
current and dynamic information. Metadata about a service, such as capabilities, 
and security requirements, are accessible via OGSA information services. 
 
3.3 Globus Toolkit 
 
The Globus Toolkit is an open source implementation of all the protocols and 
primitives defined by Open Grid Service Architecture (OSGA), for implementing 
Grid resources (Sandholm, Gawer, 2003). The Globus Toolkit is currently in its 
fourth revision (GT4). The toolkit consists of a number of components based on 
Grid requirements and capabilities defined by the OGSA specification. The OGSA 
specification was discussed in the previous sections. This section briefly discusses 
OGSA requirements within a Globus context.  
Globus makes use of a layered architecture; high level global services are 
built on a core set of lower level services (Foster, Kesselman, 1998b). One of the 
most important services within the Globus Toolkit is the resource management 
service. Globus Recourse Allocation Manager (GRAM) is responsible for allocating 
and de-allocating resources to services.  
In most distributed system architectures, communication plays a key role; 
the Globus Toolkit provides a communication component, called NEXUS. NEXUS 
is a library of lower level communication APIs that provide support for higher level 
communication (Ibid). 
Security is a major concern for Grid implementations. Grid security 
requirements are diverse. Globus Security Infrastructure (GSI) is the component 
within the toolkit that provides security. GSI mostly addresses the problem of 
authentication, and therefore leaves open a large area for future research in the 
space of Grid security (Ibid). 
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In dynamic environments such as Grid systems, there is a need to easily 
access information about services, components, and applications, in a timely 
manner. Having this information available, allows the Grid to adapt to changes in 
system structure and state. Globus Meta-Computing Directory Service (MDS) stores 
and makes the following information accessible to Grid participants: architecture 
information, operating system information, memory available on a network node, 
network bandwidth and latency, communication protocols, the mapping between IP 
addresses and network technology (Ibid). MDS provides tools and APIs to allow 
for discovery, publishing and access to information about the structure and state of 
a Grid resource. 
Health Beat Monitor (HBM) provides simple management services for 
monitoring the health and status of remote processes. The HBM consists of several 
client APIs. Grid processes register with the HBM upon initialization. HBM then 
acts as a data-collection base, it periodically receiving “heart-beat” information 
about a process. Other processes can query the HBM of the status process. 
Globus provides Global Access to Secondary Storage (GASS) this 
component provides Grid applications with access to simple C I\O libraries; and the 
ability to open, edit, save files on remote computers.   
Globus Executable Management (GEM) supports remote identification, 
creation and location of executables in heterogeneous environments. This service is 
limited in the current version of the Globus Toolkit.  
This section has highlighted several main components within the Globus 
Toolkit, each with its own purpose and name within the toolkit. The following is a 
summary-list of these components, and their commonly used abbreviated names: 
• Resource management (GRAM) – Allocates resources to jobs and 
performs process management. 
• Communication (NEXUS) – Provides communication services, network 
unicast and multicast. 
• Security (GSI) – Provides authentication and related security services. 
• Information (MDS) – Distributes access to structure and state information. 
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• Health and status (HBM) – Monitoring of health and status of system 
components. 
• Remote data access (GASS) – Remote access to data via various 
interfaces. 
• Executable Management (GEM) – Constructing, caching and location of 
executables 
 
3.3.1 Resource Management (GRAM) 
 
The Globus Resource Allocation Manager (GRAM) is responsible for managing 
computational resources in a Globus based Grid. A Globus based Grid utilizes a 
hierarchy of GRAM components. A single GRAM is responsible for a set of 
resources under the same site-specific allocation policy (single Grid site). Site-
specific GRAMs are coordinated by other higher level GRAM components, these 
components are referred to as “resource co-allocators”. GRAM is responsible of 
resource allocation and process management.  
A resource co-allocator component sits on a higher level and coordinates all 
the lower level GRAMs. GRAM can currently interact with a number of local 
resource management tools available in a variety of operating systems. The 
management of memory, storage, networks, and other resources is clearly 
important, but is not supported in current versions of the Globus Toolkit (Foster, 
Kesselman, 1998b).  
Resource Specification Language (RSL) is a generic language used by 
Globus to allow scripting of custom computation requests to the Grid. RSL allows 
the requestor to specify the types of resources needed to execute the job. Processing 
requests are submitted to the resource co-allocator in a RSL format. The co-
allocator interprets an RSL request, and breaks it down into generic requirements. 
The request is then passed to GRAMs that match the resource type requested, or to 
compatible resources that are able to execute the request. Once the job has 
completed, the co-allocator receives the outputs from all the GRAMs involved in 
the execution, and formulates a coherent return to the requestor. 
 
Chapter 3: OGSA and The Globus Toolkit 
 32
3.3.2 Communication (NEXUS) 
 
Communication services within the Globus Toolkit are provided by the NEXUS 
communication library. NEXUS provides a set of communication protocols 
relevant to a Grid implementation. It provides low-level communication APIs that 
support a wide-range of higher level communication libraries and languages, such 
as Remote Procedure Call (RPC). NEXUS communication services are used 
extensively in the implementation of other Globus modules. 
Grid communication needs are diverse. They range from point-to-point 
message passing, to unreliable multi-cast communications. It is the view of the 
GGF (Global Grid Forum) that TCP is an inappropriate communication technology 
in Grid environments. This is due to TCP’s high overhead and lack of lower level 
control.  
Traditional high-performance computing interfaces and protocols do not 
provide the communication abstraction Grids require, hence the definition of 
NEXUS. NEXUS is designed to support a wide range of lower level 
communication protocols, but still provide a degree of higher level control over 
communications. To meet the requirements of widely distributed heterogeneous 
environments. 
 
3.3.3 Security (GSI) 
 
Globus Security Infrastructure (GSI) provides a set of standard security services. 
GSI provides Grid participants with a common method of authentication and 
authorization, utilizing a public key infrastructure (PKI), implemented using X.509 
digital certificates. The merits of X.509 and other common Grid security 
mechanisms are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
Security requirements in distributed Grid environments include: 
authentication, authorization, privacy, and other security concerns (Foster, 
Kesselman, 1998b). It is difficult to adequately address all security requirements of 
Grid resources, due to the heterogeneous nature of Grids, and the fluidic 
relationships between its participants and resources.  
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3.3.4 Information (MDS) 
 
Globus Meta-computing Directory Services (MDS) provides Globus 
implementations with a rich collection of information about Grid components and 
resources. MDS stores and makes accessible information such as, architecture type, 
operating system, versioning information, memory available on machines, network 
bandwidth and latency, available communication protocols, and mapping of IPs to 
network technology 
MDS provides a suit of tools and APIs for discovering, publishing, and 
accessing information about the structure and state of a Grid; Lightweight Directory 
Access Protocol (LDAP) is used to store resource information. 
 
3.3.5 Health and Status (HBM) 
 
Heartbeat monitor (HBM) is a simple service used to remotely monitor the health 
and status of distributed processes. HBM consists of two components, a client 
interface and a data-collector API.  
The client interface allows a process to register with the HBM on execution; 
once the client has registered with HBM it then regularly sends “hart beats” to the 
HBM. If heart beasts are not received from a process, the HBM attempts to 
determine if the problem exists with the process, or the underlying infrastructure 
(network, computer, etc). 
The collector API allows other process to collect health information about a 
particular registered process.  
 
3.3.6 Remote Data Access (GASS) 
 
Global Access to Secondary Storage (GASS) is a simple module within the Globus 
Toolkit that provides remote access to files. GASS sub-system allows programs to 
use standard C I\O library to open, read\write, and append to files stored on remote 
computers. 
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3.3.7 Executable Management (GEM) 
 
Globus Execution Management (GEM) supports the execution of process within the 
Globus Toolkit. GEM supports the identification of suitable locations to execute the 
desired process, within heterogeneous environments. GEM provides mechanisms 
for matching hardware required to the executing runtimes requirements  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter introduced the Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) as a 
specification for building largely distributed Grids. OGSA defines a set of Grid 
requirements and capabilities; these requirements and capabilities were discussed in 
detail. The OGSA version 1.5 specification (Foster, et al, 2006)  formed the basis 
for this discussion. A primary requirement for OGSA based Grid systems is to 
provide interoperability between heterogeneous environments. The OGSA 
specification builds on several technologies from the Web-service community, to 
provide an interoperable and scalable service orientated architecture. (Further, the 
key to providing a stateful service orientated framework in OGSA based Grid 
systems, is the Web-service resource framework (WS-RF), which will be discussed 
in the next chapter). The Globus Toolkit - in its fourth revision and often 
abbreviated as GT4 - was also discussed, as an open source software development 
project implementing OGSA concepts.  
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Chapter 4 
 
WS-RF, Service Orientated Architecture and 
Grid Messaging 
 
Chapter 3 introduced the Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA). OGSA is a 
specification for building largely distributed heterogeneous Grids. As noted, Grids 
are built on a Web-service based Service Orientated Architecture (SOA), and 
provide interoperability between heterogeneous systems (Gerndt, 2004). Core to 
providing a service orientated framework in OGSA based Grid systems, is the 
Web-service resource framework (WS-RF). Other key Web-service technologies 
utilized in Grid environments include: Web Service Description Language 
(WDSL), Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), and Extensible Markup 
Language (XML). These technologies form the basis for all Web-service 
technologies. In order to effectively define a Grid security framework, one must 
have an understanding of how these technologies operate. This chapter will discuss 
the Web-service based Service Orientated Architecture (SOA), and how it is 
implemented in a Grid environment.  
Schulze and Madeira (1997) define Service Orientated Architecture (SOA) 
as an architecture that “supports the service lifecycle tasks of development, 
deployment, hosting and registration, and discovery and invocation”. SOA outlines 
two basic roles, the provider and the consumer. The provider develops, deploys, 
hosts, registers and manages the service, while consumers discover, and uses these 
services (Brebner, Emmerich, 2005). Within a Grid context, providers develop and 
publish services, then provide mechanisms for consumers to discover and consume 
the service. Web Service Description Language (WSDL) is used to advertise the 
published service to consumer populations, while Web-service resource framework 
(WS-RF) defines mechanisms for consumers to access and consume services in a 
stateful manner. 
WS-Resource Framework is defined as, “a set of six Web services 
specifications that define what is termed the WS-Resource approach to modeling 
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and managing state in a Web services context” (Czajkowski, Ferguson, Foster, 
Frey, Graham, Sedukhin, Snelling, Tuecke, Vambenepe, 2004b). The WS-resource 
framework version 1.1 whitepaper defines five Web-service specifications. A sixth 
standard, WS-notification was added at a later date (March 5, 2004). The WS-
resource approach provides a means to express relationships between stateful 
resources and Web-services (Ibid). This is achieved through six supporting Web-
service specifications, these specifications include: WS-ResourceLifetime, WS-
ResourceProperties, WS-RenewableReference, WS-ServiceGroup, WS-BaseFaults, 
and WS-BaseNotification. Each of these specifications will be briefly discussed in 
this chapter, and how they are utilized in a Grid context to provide a SOA. WSDL 
and SOAP will be discussed in more detail as well. WSDL is used for providing 
resource publishing and discovery. It is a document written in XML and is used to 
describe a Web-service. SOAP facilitates message exchanges between Web-service 
providers and consumers. 
 
4.1 Service Orientated Architecture 
 
Grids are built on a Service Orientated Architecture (SOA). In order to define a 
Grid security framework it is important to understand how SOA works. The Web-
service SOA provides standardization for interoperability between heterogeneous 
systems participating in a virtual organization.  
SOA is an evolution of traditional client server interactions. SOA outlines 
two basic roles: a provider and consumer, similar to traditional client\server service 
model. However, SOA provides a publishing and discovery services in order to 
facilitate consumer and provider interactions. These interactions can occur without 
the two parties having any prior knowledge of each other (no configuration 
required). This flexibility is ideal for Grids, due to the dynamic nature of Grid 
environments.  
Providers or Grid resources within a Grid context provide a service to a 
community of Grid consumers. Consumers access and utilize services published by 
providers. A single Grid site, or participating organization might contain a number 
of Grid resources, and Grid users. Grids implement a SOA utilizing Web-services 
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and related standards, “Web-services standardize the messages that entities in a 
distributed system must exchange in order to perform various operations” (Open 
Grid Forum, 2005).  
OGSA Grids utilize the Web-Service resource framework (WS-RF) to 
provide a SOA. WS-RF makes provision for publishing and discovery of stateful 
Web-services. The following section will discuss WS-RF in more detail.  
 
4.2 Web-service Resource Framework (WS-RF)  
 
WS-RF is addresses short-comings in the Open Grid Service Infrastructure (OGSI), 
the precursor to OGSA. WS-RF defines a set of conventions and extensions on the 
use of Web Service Definition Language (WSDL) and XML Schema to enable 
stateful Web services (Czajkowski, Ferguson, Foster, Frey, Graham, Maguire, 
Snelling, Tuecke, 2004). Older versions of the OGSA specification were 
conceptualized around OGSI. OGSI was found to be complex and not easily 
implemented. WS-RF is an evolution of OGSI, and brings the convergence of the 
Web-service and Grid communities. It is a Web-service based standard that has 
been developed concurrently with OGSA. WS-RF allows WS-Resources to be 
declared, created, accessed, monitored for change, and destroyed via conventional 
Web services mechanisms (Ibid). 
The WS-RF is made up of six technical specifications which define the WS-
Resource approach, in terms of specific Web-service message exchanges and 
related XML definitions. Liming describes the relationship between WS-RF and 
XML as follows, “WS-RF specifies how XML can be used to describe and access 
resource properties, clarifies how stateful resources are addressed, and defines how 
resources may be created or destroyed, individually or collectively” (Liming, 
Garritano, Tuecke, 2004). The following table describes each of the standards that 
make up the WS-RF, and their general purpose within the framework: 
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Table 4.1: A list of WS-RF specifications 
Name Description 
WS-ResourceLifetime Addresses three important aspects of lifetime 
management, creation of a resource instance, 
identification, and destruction. 
WS-ResourceProperties Provides a definition of a WS-Resource, in terms of 
the resource properties. Also provides mechanisms 
for retrieving, changing and deleting WS-Resource 
properties. 
WS-RenewableReference Provides Web-service end point management 
functions. 
WS-ServiceGroup Defines a means to manage multiple heterogeneous 
Web-service references. 
WS-BaseFaults A base fault XML type used to return error and 
exception information. 
WS-Notification This is a separate set of specifications, which builds 
on the WS-RF. WS-Notification provides a system 
for publisher and subscriber interactions between 
Web-services and users. 
 
The following sub sections will discuss these specifications in more detail. 
 
4.2.1 WS-ResourceLifetime 
 
This specification is primarily concerned with lifetime management issues around 
the invocation of a Web-service. The WS-ResourceLifetime specification addresses 
three important aspects of the WS-Resource lifecycle, these include: creation, 
management and destruction. 
New WS-Resources are created through a WS-Resource Factory. WS-
Resource Factory is based on a commonly used pattern for object creation (Gamma, 
Helm, Johnson, Vlissides, 1995). A WS-Resource Factory is defined as, “any Web-
service capable of bringing one or more WS-Resources into existence” 
(Czajkowski, et al, 2004). The typical result of WS-Resource factory is at least one 
endpoint reference to a new WS-Resource. Stateful resource information is 
encapsulated within the WS-Resource implementation. The WS-Resource stateful 
resources are identified through the use of a stateful resource identifier. Czajkowshi 
explains, “The form and contents of the stateful resource identifier carried in the 
reference properties is completely encapsulated within the WS-Resource 
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implementation” (Ibid). WS-Resources are intended to provide the ability to 
retrieve a resource identity. The identity should be portable.  
Typically only the requestor for a WS-Resource from a WS-Resource 
factory will be the only interested party in that resource, at least for some finite 
period. After that period has expired, it should be possible to destroy the WS-
Resource, in order to claim back the system resources used in its creation and 
period of existence. WS-RF standardizes two approaches for the destruction of WS-
resources:  
• Immediate, and  
• Scheduled destruction 
Immediate destruction of a WS-Resource might be necessary for any reason. 
This often achieved by the requestor to send the appropriate request to the resource. 
Scheduled destruction allows for WS-Resources to be destroyed at a later stage, a 
number of possible reasons. The requestor might not wish to destroy the resource, 
or might be unable to do so. 
 
4.2.2 WS-ResourceProperties 
 
The WS-ResourceProperties specification defines a method for service requestors 
to view and modify the state of a WS-Resource’s state. WS-ResourceProperties 
relies on the following three ideas to perform its task (Ibid):  
• Each WS-Resource has an XML resource property document defined using 
an XML scheme;  
• Service requestors may determine the WS-resource’s type by retrieving the 
WSDL (Web Service Description Language) portType definition, via 
standard Web-service means;  
• And a service requestor may use Web-service message exchanges to read, 
modify, and query the XML document representing the WS-Resource’s 
state. 
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4.2.2.1 WS-Resource Properties Document 
 
The WS-Resource properties document acts as a view of the state of the WS-
Resource, expressed in XML. Service requestors can request the properties 
document. The document defines the structure service-requestor-initiated query and 
update messages can be directed. Consider the following scenario, as described in 
the WS-RF whitepaper (Ibid): Consider a stateful resource named “C.” If the state 
of “C” comprises three resource property components, named p1, p2, and p3, then 
its resource properties document, named “ExampleResourceProperties,” might be 
defined as follows. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: An example of a simple WS-Resource properties document 
 
A service requestor can obtain and view this document through various 
means. The service requestor learns of the Global Element Declaration (GED) 
named “ExampleResourceProperties” from the WSDL (Web Service Description 
Language) portType definition of the Web service component of the WS-Resource. 
The WS-Resource properties document declaration is associated with the 
WSDL portType definition via the use of the ResourceProperties attribute, as in the 
following example (Ibid): 
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Figure 4.2: An example of a WSDL portType definition  
 
This association between the portType and resource properties document 
effectively defines the type of the WS-Resource. 
 
4.2.2.2 WS-Resource Property Composition 
 
In WSDL 1.1, the designer of a Web-service interface composes the interface of the 
operations defined in the constituent portTypes used in the composition. A 
portType can constitute multiple standards and specifications to produce a final, 
complete set of message exchanges to be implemented by a Web service. 
 
4.2.2.3 Accessing WS-Resource Property Values 
 
The state of a WS-Resource, i.e., the values of resource properties exposed in the 
WS-Resource’s resource properties document, can be read, modified, and queried 
by using standard Web services messages (Ibid). 
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4.2.3 WS-RenewableReference 
 
WS-Renewable Reference renews a Web-service endpoint that becomes invalid. 
These mechanisms can be useful to WS-Resource endpoints as they can provide 
persistent and stable reference to the WS-Resource that can allow the same state to 
be accessed repeatedly over time. 
  
4.2.4 WS-ServiceGroup 
 
The WS-Service group specification is used to manage multiple WS-Resources. 
 
4.2.5 WS-BaseFaults 
 
The WS-BaseFaults specification defines a base fault type. Base fault types are use 
for returning fault information when an error occurs during a Web-services 
message exchange. WS-BaseFaults is used by all of the other WS-RF 
specifications, to provide consistent reporting of faults relating to WS-Resource 
definition and use (Ibid). 
 
4.2.6 WS-Notification 
 
The WS-Notification specification is separate to the core WS-RF specifications. 
WS-Notification defines a Web-service system for publisher\subscriber interactions 
(Ibid). The specification builds onto WS-RF to provide notifications to subscribers 
on a ‘topic’ of interest, such as resource property value changes for a WS-Resource. 
WS-Notification essentially builds on the utility of WS-Resource by allowing 
requestors to ask to be asynchronously notified of changes to resource property 
values. 
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4.3 Grid Messaging 
 
It was previously discussed Grids are implemented utilizing a Web-service based 
Service Orientated Architecture (SOA). Grid SOA is implemented through the 
Web-service resource framework (WS-RF) set of specifications. WS-RF provides 
Web-services with publishing, discovery, as well as state management services.  
Web-services differ from other distributed computing paradigms. This is due to its 
focus on XML based Web-standards to address heterogeneous distributed 
computing (Foster, et al, 2002a). WSDL and SOAP are two XML based standards, 
which provide a platform neutral message exchange mechanism. These 
mechanisms allow for Grids to support the dynamic discovery and composition of 
services in heterogeneous Grid environments. WSDL has a focus on describing 
services, while SOAP is more concerned with facilitating communication. 
 
4.3.1 Web-service Description Language (WSDL) 
 
Web Service Description Language (WSDL) is a core technology in Grid 
implementations. Foster describes WSDL within an OGSA context as follows:  
• “This architecture (OGSA) uses the Web Services Description Language 
(WSDL) to achieve self-describing, discoverable services and interoperable 
protocols, with extensions to support multiple coordinated interfaces and 
change management” (Foster, et al, 2002a).  
Understanding the basic purpose and mechanisms of WSDL will allow for a greater 
understanding of Grid security. WSDL is defined as an, “XML document for 
describing Web services as a set of endpoints operating on messages containing 
either document-orientated messaging, or RPC payloads” (Christensen, Curbera, 
Meredith, Weerawarana, 2001). Primary in a Grid context, WSDL utilizes a 
document-oriented messaging scheme, making use of XML documents. 
WSDL provides dynamic discovery and composition of services in 
heterogeneous environments necessitates mechanisms for registering and 
discovering interface definitions and endpoint implementation descriptions. WSDL 
supports this requirement by providing a standard mechanism for defining interface 
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definitions separately from their embodiment within a particular binding (transport 
protocol and data encoding format) (Foster, et al, 2002a). WSDL enables the 
publishing of services across multiple network protocols and message encoding 
formats.  
WSDL defines a Web-service as collections of communication end points 
that can exchange certain messages. WSDL documents describe a Web-services 
interface and provide users with a point of contact on the remote server. In other 
words a WSDL document will describe an abstract interface for remote users to 
connect to, and specific protocol-dependent details that users must follow to access 
the service. 
 
4.3.2 Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is a simple enveloping mechanism for 
XML, and provides a means of messaging between a service provider and 
requestors. SOAP is an XML-based protocol for messaging and remote procedure 
calls (RPCs). It provides a platform independent and lightweight communication 
protocol over the World Wide Web (WWW) (Curbera, Duftler, Khalaf, Nagy, 
Mukhi, Weerawarana, 2002). On top of a basic messaging structure, the SOAP 
specification defines a model that dictates how recipients should process SOAP 
messages. 
SOAP documents are typically a simple XML document with a single 
element and two child elements (Ibid). The first element is typically a header and 
the second contains body elements. Consider the following figure, a basic SOAP 
envelope: 
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Figure 4.3: A simple SOAP envelope 
 
SOAP can be used to execute Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) on the desired 
Web-service. In order to utilize SOAP to execute remote functionality, standard 
mechanisms are required on the server to transform the SOAP XML representation 
of variables and call data into native typed values. The World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) provides standard XML scheme specification for providing a 
standard language for defining the document structure and the XML structures’ 
data types. 
Consider the following scenario, a user wishes to execute a remote 
procedure to do some arbitrary unit of work. The user learns of the service and its 
requirements via WSDL services. The desired service has a function name of, 
“UserFuntionA”, this function takes a single integer type as a parameter, and 
returns a two-row data structure. A SOAP document is passed to the service, via a 
standard HTTP POST command. The document is parsed and interpreted by the 
Web server. In this SOAP envelope, the call to “UserFuntionA” is an XML element 
with attributes that include information about the encoding (note the references to 
XML, “http://Schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope”).  The element's children are 
the method call's arguments, in this instance the integer value taken in as a 
parameter, by the function. Once the operation is complete the service returns a 
formatted XML document to the service caller, with the desired output. To make 
the above interaction possible both parties must agree on the XML scheme for 
communications. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses Service Orientated Architecture (SOA), and how it relates to 
the implementation of OGSA compatible Grids. The Web-Service Resource 
Framework (WS-RF) is a set of specifications utilized by OGSA to provide stateful 
Web-services. Web-services are built upon to provide communication between 
heterogeneous and dispersed parties. Two standards that support WS-RF were 
discussed: Web Service Description Language (WSDL) and Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP).  WSDL is a method to describe services, while SOAP is 
primarily concerned with simple, low overhead communication. 
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Chapter 5 
 
STRIDE and OGSA Grid Layers  
 
Chapter 4 discussed the WS-RF. WS-RF is utilized to implement a Web service-
based SOA within OGSA-based Grids. The goal of this research is to work towards 
a holistic framework for OGSA-based Grid security. Providing adequate security to 
Grid users will allow for wide user adoption of the technology (Schopf, 2002).  
The OGSA specification defines capabilities that can be represented in three 
high-level tiers (Foster, et al, 2006); these tiers are a logical, abstract, semi-layered 
representation of some of the OGSA capabilities. In the article entitled “Anatomy 
of the Grid” (Foster, et al, 2001) discusses a five-layer structure, outlining technical 
requirements at the various OGSA capabilities tiers. Some of these layers overlap 
between OGSA tiers.  
For the purpose of a Grid-security framework, this research will outline two 
logical layers. These layers are derived from previous work done by Foster and 
other contributors to the definition of the OGSA specification (Foster, et al, 2001, 
2006). These two layers are the political (inter-organisational) “Common Grid 
Layer” and the “Local Grid Resource Layer”. The logical division is made for the 
purpose of identifying security challenges faced by Grid designers. Both layers 
have their own unique set of security challenges. In order to define an effective 
holistic security strategy; all or most of the security challenges faced in each tier 
need to be identified and addressed, if possible. 
The Common Grid Layer is primarily concerned with the interaction of all 
participating sites in a virtual organization. The challenges faced on this layer are 
typically cross-organization trust, and securely administering site-to-site 
interactions. Virtual organizations are constantly-changing, dynamic structures. 
There are many physical organizations participating within a virtual organization 
context, having varying levels of trust between them, as well as varying and 
potentially incompatible security policies and technologies. The challenge for Grid 
designers on the common Grid layer is to provide transparent cross-site 
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authentication and authorization. When a user authenticates to a Grid he\she should 
be able to use any resource, provided they have the correct access privileges, 
without being required to constantly authenticate.  
The Local Resource Layer is concerned with data and computational Grid 
resources as a separate local entity below the Common Grid Layer. This layer is 
concerned with the lower-level Grid security issues. Grid resource protocols 
(OGSA middle tier) are concerned entirely with Grid fabric, and hence ignore 
issues of global state and atomic actions of the distributed collections (Foster, et al, 
2001). For this reason one can focus on local Grid resource issues. Some of the 
primary security concerns for Grids on this layer include: the hosting environment 
and applications security, machine and operating system security, network and 
communication security, and message security (See Grid specific messaging, 
typically XML based, in chapter 4) (Siebenlist, Welch,  Tuecke, Foster, 
Nagaratnam, Janson, Dayka, Nadalin, 2002). 
The goal of Grid computing is to provide resource sharing, whether it is 
storage, computational power, or specialized hardware; in a non-platform\hardware 
specific manner, promoting collaboration between heterogeneous, globally 
dispersed parties (Foster, et al, 2001). The possibility of defining a security 
strategy, considering each possible attack avenue that attackers can make use of, on 
each commercial and non-commercial operating system, hosting environment, 
multiple possible network and communication protocols, etc., is overwhelming. 
When considering the possible magnitude of a Grid implementation, within a 
virtual organization context (VO), the task seems more then a little onerous. One 
feasible approach – as advocated in this study - is use a threat-perspective, to group 
attacker’s goals and action into generic categories, for the purpose of defining a 
Grid-security framework.  
To this end, the security framework defined in this research will be based on 
STRIDE. STRIDE is an acronym for prominent threat categories faced by computer 
systems and can be extrapolated to include Grid computing. These threats are 
grouped into six categories: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information 
Disclosure, Denial-of-Service, and Elevation of Privileges (Meier, et al, 2003). The 
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merits of STRIDE will be discussed in this Chapter. STRIDE as a threat 
classification scheme will be utilized in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
The following Chapter will highlight the security challenges faced at each 
layer in more detail, and propose possible solutions to be considered for a holistic 
framework for Grid security. 
 
5.1. Grid Security  
 
In a survey published by Schopf, it was found that in order for Grids to achieve 
wide adoption, they must be secure enough (Schopf, 2002). Grids need to assure 
secure access and communication. Due to Grid requirements and the nature of 
Grids, these requirements are not easily met. Grids introduce a new set of security 
challenges; a Grid will, typically, make use of multiple communications and 
transport protocols cross organization and administrative domains and be deployed 
across multiple platforms and operating systems (Foster, et al, 2001; Foster, et al, 
2002a).  Grid-security issues can be logically divided into two levels. There are 
issues around underlying technologies and infrastructure (lower Grid level), as well 
as higher-level political issues (higher-Grid level).  
Lower-level Grid-security issues are primarily concerned with platform and 
OS security, application security, and network security (The Local Resource 
Layer), while higher-level Grid issues include: authentication, authorization, 
accounting, credential delegation and conversion, and single sign-on (The Common 
Grid Layer).  
The goals of this research are two-fold, (1) to define a broker to facilitate 
high- level Grid security needs (Chapter 6, Common Grid layer), and (2) to define a 
generic security strategy Grid designers can implement to secure their Grid fabric 
(Chapter 7, Local Resource Layer). The STRIDE threat classification scheme will 
be used to evaluate the broker defined in Chapter 6, while in Chapter 7 STRIDE 
will form the basis of the proposed Grid resource security framework. The security 
framework will be defined from the perspective of a Grid; and how its components 
are at risk of attack, based on the goals or intentions of an attacker. (STRIDE 
categories will be primarily considered here). This approach is known as threat-
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modeling (Heckman, 2006). The threat-modeling process allows Grid security 
architects to methodically identify threats faced by their Grids, providing assurance 
to Grid users and maintaining information security.  
 
5.1.1 Information Security 
 
Information Security is concerned with protecting information and computing 
resources from external threats and attacks (Whitman, Mattord, 2003, pg 9). A 
threat is the possibility of a Grid asset being attacked or compromised, via a 
vulnerability that exists in the Grid. Vulnerabilities are weakness in systems (Grids) 
that are exploited by attackers when attacking an asset. In order to minimize 
security failure, one must have an idea of what security success entails (Hernan, 
Lambert, Ostwald, Shostack, 2006). Hernan et al explain that a secure system has 
the properties of confidentiality, integrity, and availability and that users are 
authenticated and authorized correctly, and that transactions are non-repudiable 
(Ibid). The three properties of information security, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability, are collectively known as the CIA triangle.  
The CIA triangle has been considered an industry standard for information 
security since the development of the mainframe (Whitman, Mattord, 2003, pg 10). 
The CIA triangle is still considered widely relevant today in the information-
security field.  CIA properties are defined as (Hernan, et al, 2006; Whitman, 
Mattord, 2003, pg 10-13): 
• Confidentiality: Data is only available to the people intended to 
access it. 
• Integrity: Data and system resources are only changed in 
appropriate ways by appropriate people. 
• Availability: Systems are ready when needed and perform 
acceptably. 
Threat-modeling is a method that can be employed by Grid designers, to 
ensure that Grids have these security properties (Ibid) 
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5.1.2 STRIDE As A Threat-classification Scheme 
 
There are a wide range of possible attacks, and further fine-grained variations on 
these attacks. The best method to classify threats to one’s system is to identify the 
hacker’s goals when performing an attack. STRIDE is relevant to Grids and will be 
used to evaluate the proposed brokered approach in Chapter 6, and will be used as 
the basis for a Grid resource security framework in Chapter 7. As mentioned, 
STRIDE is an acronym used to group the following types of threats (Meier, et al, 
2003; Hernan, et al, 2006): 
• Spoofing - The hacker’s goal when spoofing is to try gain access to the 
system by mimicking legitimate user-credentials or network traffic. 
• Tampering – This is the unauthorized altering of information, while it is in 
transit between two computers. 
• Repudiation – Prevents administrators from knowing if users (legitimate or 
not), have performed an action. 
• Information disclosure – This is the unwanted exposure of private 
information. 
• Denial of Service – This is the process of making services unavailable to 
users. 
• Elevation of privileges – This attack occurs when a user of limited 
privileges assumes the roll of a privileged user, in order to steal, corrupt, or 
deny access to information asset. 
 The following sub-sections will discuss these threat categories in more detail. 
 
5.1.2.1 Spoofing 
 
Spoofing is when a hacker tries to gain access to system illegitimately, by 
mimicking legitimate behaviour. Typical forms of spoofing applicable to Grids are 
user-credential spoofing and IP-address spoofing. 
User-credential spoofing occurs when an illegitimate user obtains a 
legitimate user credential or certificate. This is typically through some method of 
password guessing, such as brute force, or dictionary attacks. User-credential 
Chapter 5: STRIDE and OGSA Grid Layers 
 
 52
spoofing allows a hacker to “walk in the front door”, allowing them to bypass 
security measures put in place. 
IP-address spoofing occurs when a hacker assumes the TCP\IP 
(Transmission Control Protocol\Internet Protocol) address for the purpose of 
exploiting a trust relationship between communicating parties. This method of 
spoofing is harder to achieve than user-credential spoofing, and as a result is less 
common practice. 
 
5.1.2.2 Tampering 
 
Tampering is the unauthorized altering of information, either when in transit 
between two communicating parties, or when stored on a network terminal. The 
goal of the attacker when tampering could be either to gain access to a Grid, by 
altering network traffic into fooling authentication mechanisms, or it could be to 
destroy and invalidate data stored on network servers or terminals. 
 
5.1.2.3 Repudiation (Non-Repudiation) 
 
Repudiation is when the actions of users cannot be verified, typically through 
system logs being deleted. 
 
5.1.2.4 Information Disclosure 
 
Information disclosure is the unwanted exposure of private information. 
 
5.1.2.5 Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
 
Denial of service is the process of making computing services unavailable to the 
users. Denial of service attacks are often the last resort for an attacker that cannot 
successfully penetrate a Grid and launch their desired attack. 
 
5.1.2.6 Elevation Of Privileges 
 
This occurs when a user with limited access credentials is upgraded to a user with 
greater access credentials, and is a typical method used by attackers to launch an 
attack against a Grid.  
Chapter 5: STRIDE and OGSA Grid Layers 
 
 53
5.1.3 STRIDE and Grid Threat-modelling  
 
Threat-modelling is defined as, “the methodical review of a system design or 
architecture to discover and correct design-level security problems” (Hernan, et al, 
2006).  STRIDE is considered to be a finer-grain version of the CIA triangle 
(Howerd, Lipner, 2003). STRIDE was discussed in the previous section. From a 
threat-modelling perspective it is possible to map threats defined by STRIDE to 
system security properties beyond the CIA triangle. Consider the following table 
(Hernan, et al, 2006): 
 
Table 5.1: A mapping of STIDE threat categories to security services 
Threat Security Service 
Spoofing Authentication 
Tampering Integrity 
Repudiation Non-repudiation 
Information disclosure Confidentiality 
Denial of Service Availability 
Elevation of privileges Authorization 
 
From the above table it can be seen that STRIDE defines an additional three 
security services to those defined by the CIA triangle. These services are: 
authentication, non-repudiation, and authorization. Consider the following 
definitions of these services (Hernan, et al, 2006). (Refer to section 5.1.1 for 
definitions of CIA properties). 
• Authentication: The identity of users is established (some challenge 
mechanism is require, i.e. username and password). 
• Non-repudiation: Users cannot perform an action and later deny 
performing it. 
• Authorization: Users are explicitly allowed or denied access to 
resources, based on their authentication credentials tested against a 
policy. 
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These additional services build on the CIA in that they provide 
consideration for modern networked systems. Since Grids are primarily network-
based systems, this makes STRIDE a strong foundation for a Grid-security 
framework.  
An attacker will generally employ several generic steps to attack a system 
(See Chapter 7, section 7.1.1 for more details). Blocking multiple steps or 
employing multiple ways to stop one step is considered a defence in-depth 
approach to security (Salter, 1998). STRIDE threat categories and their related 
security services allow one to address different aspects of an attack. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 
5.1.4 Conclusion 
 
This section discussed information security principles. The CIA triangle was 
discussed as well as STRIDE. STRIDE defines an additional three security services 
to the CIA triangle. The following sections will discuss OGSA Grid physiology, as 
defined by Foster (Foster, et al, 2001; Foster, et al, 2006). The two logical Grid 
layers mentioned earlier will be defined and discussed. These layers will be used as 
a foundation for defining a Grid-security framework. The following sections will 
discuss the OGSA Grid physiology, defined in the OGSA specification (Foster, et 
al, 2006).  
 
5.2. OGSA Grid Physiology 
 
OGSA describes three logical tiers in a Grid. These tiers were discussed in chapter 
3; they include (Foster, et al, 2006): 
The base resource tier contains base resources. Base resources are 
supporting underlying entities and artifacts that may be logical or physical, and 
have relevance outside OGSA. This may include hardware (CPU, memory, disk 
space), or OS processes, etc. All of these need to be protected during access from 
VO members and executing processes, particularly if spoofing, tampering, 
repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, or elevation of privilege 
(STRIDE) attempts are being made. 
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The virtualization and abstraction tier defines capabilities directly relevant 
to OGSA Grids (See Chapter 3, section 3.2). These capabilities allow for support of 
applications and processes on a higher level of the Grid architecture. A detailed 
relationship between the middle tier and lower tier (or base resource tier) exists 
(Foster, et al, 2006). This tier is where STRIDE attacks need to be addressed in a 
Grid-wide manner. 
The application tier is a logical representation of applications and process, 
built on OGSA to realize user and domain-orientated processes and functionality 
(such as business processes) (Foster, et al, 2006). All user and process security 
credentials emanating from this layer need to be brokered between this layer and 
the base resource layer in order to persist (assert) authentication and authorization 
(from top to bottom). 
Foster describes several additional layers within the three OGSA tiers 
(Foster, et al, 2001). Each of these layers can logically be mapped to an OGSA-
specified tier. These layers include: 
• Application layer 
• Collective layer 
• Resource layer 
• Connectivity layer 
• Fabric layer 
The fabric layer consists of all native services and resources (Grid fabric). 
To reiterate, these are the resources that Grid designers wish to make available to a 
virtual organizations; this could range from processing components, to highly 
specialized equipment such as telescopes. As standalone components the elements 
of the fabric layer are typically built on non-standard platforms, such as JAVA or 
.NET; and are run on various operating systems, such as Windows, LINUX or 
UNIX. OGSA-based Grid fabric is exposed to the Grid through open and 
interoperable Web-service interfaces, thus allowing for SOAP-based security 
features to be incorporated. Standardised SOAP headers can be used to negotiate 
security at various levels of the fabric layer (e.g. at network/directory services, 
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operating system levels/folder-access levels, process-execution/code-object levels, 
etc). 
The connectivity layer – which is a sub-set of the middle layer - defines core 
communication and authentication protocols required for Grid-specific network 
transactions (Foster, et al, 2001). Grid authentication and authorization is taken care 
of at this layer. Any network-based security, such as IPSec or TLS, can be applied 
here. SOAP messaging security typically operates at the application level where 
SOAP headers are read by processing applications (of services) in the resource 
layer. 
The resource layer is where the OGSA specification allows for standalone 
heterogeneous components, within the fabric layer, to talk to one another 
transparently and dynamically, as well as logically or grouped components as part 
of some higher-level workflow or process.  
The resource layer builds on connectivity communications and 
authentication protocols to define protocols (and APIs and SDKs) for secure 
negotiation, initiation, monitoring, control, accounting and payment of sharing 
operations on individual resources (Foster, et al, 2001). Protocols at this layer are 
designed so they can be implemented on top of actual services in the Fabric layer.  
The collective layer is a logical grouping of resources exposed to the Grid 
via the fabric layer. This grouping allows for a wide range of global services and 
application specific behaviours, hence the name collective because it involves the 
coordinated (“collective”) use of multiple resources (Foster, et al, 2001). 
The application layer is simply the result of all other layers working 
together to provide non-trivial services within a virtual organization. 
The following table illustrates how different aspects of IT infrastructure 
would be logically grouped in these layers: 
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Table 5.2: How the layers of a grid are grouped by IT infrastructure 
Layers in a Grid Infrastructure\Service aspects 
Application Any non-trivial Grid derived applications 
(e.g. cross-organization data warehouse)  
Collective Resource discovery, resource brokering, 
system monitoring, cross domain 
authentication 
Resource Access to data, Access to information 
services (service state, status, etc), 
performance information 
Connectivity Communication (IP), Discovery Services 
(DNS, WSDL), authentication, authorization, 
delegation 
Fabric Processing resources, cluster servers, 
networks, databases, computers, networks 
 
5.3. Abstract Grid layers  
 
The three high-level abstract tiers of OGSA capabilities were discussed in previous 
sections.  These tiers include the base resource tier (bottom tier), the virtualization 
and abstraction tier (middle tier), and the application tier (Top tier). In related work, 
Foster defines five logical layers with regard to Grid capabilities (Foster, et al, 
2001). These five layers were discussed in previous sections as well (fabric, 
connectivity, resource, collective, and application).  
These layers are broken down into smaller technical requirements for 
implementing OGSA-based Grid systems. There is an overlap between these 
defined layers and the OGSA abstract tiers. For the purpose of this research, Grids 
will be discussed in terms of two abstracted layers (the Local Resource Layer, and 
The Common Grid Layer). The Grid is divided into these two layers to address 
various Grid security challenges. 
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5.3.1 Common Grid Layer 
 
The common Grid layer is an abstract layer. This layer is concerned with high level 
Grid security issues. Grids security challenges are unique: Grids typically span 
organization and administrative domains. Although OGSA defines standard 
mechanisms for service publishing and discovery, the underlying infrastructure 
might differ from site-to-site. Sites might implement different authentication 
technologies (Kerberos, SSH, SSL, etc), might make use of varying platforms and 
operating systems, incompatible security policies, communication protocols, etc. 
With these concerns in mind the Common Grid Layer is defined and is concerned 
with providing Grid users with cross-site authentication and authorization, the 
delegation of user credentials between various sites, and bridging between 
incompatible security policies and technologies. 
 
5.3.1 Local Grid Resource Layer 
 
The Local Grid Resource Layer is concerned with the security challenges at a 
single Grid site. This layer is concerned with securing Grid fabric and Grid 
resources from outside attackers and threats. A Grid-security framework needs to 
be generic in order to be widely relevant to Grid participants. Grid participants 
make use of varying platforms and technologies.  
This study will use STRIDE as a basis for defining an overall Grid-security 
framework.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
STRIDE and the CIA triangle were discussed. It was discovered OGSA Grid 
capabilities are divided into three high-level tiers. These layers include: the base 
resource tier (bottom tier), the virtualization and abstraction tier (middle tier), and 
the application tier (top tier). Furthermore, these layers are a logical, abstract, semi-
layered representation of some of the OGSA capabilities. Five more layers 
(application, collective, resource, connectivity, fabric) within these tiers were 
discussed; these layers define technical requirements within the OGSA tier 
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structure. From these layers, two higher levels (the Common Grid Layer and the 
Local Resource Layer) are derived; these layers are concerned with Grid security 
challenges.  For the purpose of defining a security framework, these two layers will 
be discussed in greater detail, in Chapter 6, and Chapter 7. Chapter 6 will discuss 
higher-level Grid security concerns (the Common Grid Layer), while Chapter 7 is 
concerned with lower-level Grid security concerns (the Local Resource Layer). 
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Chapter 6 
 
A Brokered Approach To OGSA Grid Security 
 
In chapter 5, two logical layers of a Grid were discussed: the “Common Grid 
Layer” and the “Local Resource Layer”. This section is primarily concerned with 
the security challenges faced by the Common Grid layer. These challenges include 
cross-site authentication and authorization, delegation of user credentials, and 
compatibility of security policies between participants within multi-organizational 
Grid. This chapter will propose a brokered approach to addressing Grid security 
issues on the Common Grid Layer. STRIDE was discussed in chapter 5. Elements 
required to implement a broker will be discussed and evaluated against STRIDE. 
The Common Grid Layer is concerned with higher-level Grid security 
issues. These issues are concerned with the Grid as a whole in a Virtual 
Organization (VO) context, and all the security challenges associated with cross-
domain administration. Grids consist of large dynamic populations that could be 
made-up of a number of different physical organizations, possibly spanning the 
globe.  
Authentication and authorization between sites could prove to be an 
administrative challenge. Cross-site authentication maps for every possible user to 
every possible resource are difficult to implement and maintain. Storing remote 
user credentials on a local resource is impractical (because of differing 
authentication mechanisms) and does not allow for scalability. Lingering user 
credentials for a resource is a major security concern. Virtual organizations 
potentially have a large user turnover. Users that are no longer part of the VO could 
have access credentials to Grid resources. Such users are a large security risk. 
The Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) requires large scale, cross-
organization authentication and authorizations (Foster, et al; 2006). Current OGSA 
implementations (Globus toolkit) primarily make use of X.509 certificates to 
provide authentication and secure communication between Grid participants. 
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However this is an extra layer put on top of the existing security infrastructure that 
exists at participants sites. The goal of this chapter is to: 
• Identify the primary security challenges faced by Grid designers on the 
Common Grid Layer. 
• Provide a detailed description of a proposed strategy for implementing 
managed site-to-site authentication, utilizing a brokered approach. 
• Apply STRIDE as a threat classification scheme, and evaluate the proposed 
brokered approach to it. 
• Finally, conclude and reflect on the proposed brokered approach. 
 
6.1 Cross-site Grid Security Challenges In An OGSA 
Context 
 
Sites participating in Grid, within a virtual organization (VO) context are generally 
managed and maintained by separate administrative groups. The OGSA 
specification has no formal definition of a brokered service although Foster 
describes the use of a broker to simplify inter-Grid communication and trust 
services (Foster, Kesselman, Tsudik, Tuecke, 1998). Consider the following 
scenario: a typical Grid interaction between Grid participants as described by Foster 
(Ibid): 
User-A at Site-A starts an analysis program that sends code to be executed 
on Site-B, but Site-B requires a dataset on Site-C to perform the analysis. The 
application at Site-A contacts a broker at Site-D to obtain idle resources needed to 
process the task at hand. The broker then initiates communications with sites E, F, 
G in order to complete the task at hand. These sites will need to maintain 
communication between them (possibly using a multicast protocol), as well as the 
broker, the original site (requesting site), and the user.   
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Figure 6.1: Example of a large scale distributed computing environment 
 
The Above scenario (figure 6.1) depicts many distinctive characteristics of a 
Grid computing environment (Foster, et al, 1998): 
• The resource pool is large and dynamic. 
• A computation (or processes created by a computation) may acquire, start 
processes on, and release resources dynamically during its execution.  
• The processes constituting a computation may communicate by using a 
variety of mechanisms. Low-level communications (e.g. TCP/IP sockets) 
can be created and destroyed dynamically during program execution. 
• Resources may require different authentication and authorization 
mechanisms and policies, which we will have limited ability to change. In 
the above example, this was illustrated by showing the local access control 
policies that apply at different sites. These include Kerberos, Secure Socket 
Library (SSL) and Secure Shell (SSH).  
• An individual user will be associated with different local name spaces, 
credentials, or accounts, at different sites, for the purposes of accounting 
and access control. 
• Resources and users may be located in different countries. 
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There is need to provide security solutions to Grid users that can allow 
computations, such as in the above described scenario. These solutions must allow 
for the co-ordination of diverse access control policies and to allow them to operate 
securely in heterogeneous environments (Foster, Kesselman, 1998). 
The cross-domain Grid administrations must provide Grid participants with 
the following set of requirements, to allow Grid users to transparently use Grid 
resources (Butler, Engert, Foster, Kesselman, Tuecke, Volmer, Welch, 2002; 
Nagaratnam, Janson, Dayka, Nadalin, Siebenlist, Welch, Foster, Tuecke; 2002): 
• Authentication: Authentication points that support multiple authentication 
technologies and protocols are required. 
• Authorization: Authorization should regulate the access to Grid resources 
based on access-control policies policies. 
• Single sign on: Users must be able to logon once, and have access to 
multiple Grid resources without having to constantly provide credentials. 
• Delegation: A program must have the ability to run on the user that initiates 
its behalf. This allows the program to access the resources that it might 
need, that the calling user has access to.   
• User-based trust relationships: In order to provide transparency to Grid 
users, Grid site security administrators must have no need to interact with 
one another. Grid participants should be able to “plug-in” and not have to 
consciously make provision for inter-site trust. Some middleware is required 
to automate these tasks. 
 
In order to support a global Grid security infrastructure within a VO, a 
broker can be used to facilitate communications, authentication and authorization at 
a central site. A broker could take into consideration all the above mentioned 
requirements.  It can be implemented through the use of various services and 
middleware. The following section will discuss a broker within an OGSA context. 
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6.2 Brokered Approach To Interoperable Security 
 
This section is concerned with defining a brokered approach to implementing a 
uniform Grid-wide security structure. As highlighted in the previous section, Grid 
designers are faced with the challenge of providing robust and scalable cross-site 
trust relationships. Sites within a virtual organization often make use of 
incompatible security technologies, such as Kerberos, Secure Socket Layer (SSL), 
Secure Shell (SSH), etc. It becomes a tedious administrative task for local 
administrators to define local access credentials for all external users that wish to 
access local resources.   
In order to make large-scale VOs feasible for mainstream adoption, 
mechanisms are needed to provide a context to associate users, requests, resources, 
policies and agreements across operational boundaries. When sharing resources 
across organizational boundaries, certain security needs are implied (OGSA 
specification 1.5). The brokered approach could implement many of the Grid user 
requirements (as identified in section 6.1). These include: Single sign-on, 
delegation, interaction with various local security solutions, and user-based trust 
relationships. 
 
6.2.1 The Functions Of A Broker In A Grid 
 
The proposed broker is an abstract software component. Its primary purpose is to 
provide centrally hosted services to facilitate secure interoperable communications 
between Grid participants. The broker facilitates the complex trust relationships 
that exist between Grid parties. When a user initiates a communication to a resource 
on another site, the broker will handle authentication and authorization of that user.  
The broker stores a directory of all Grid users and resource, as well as access 
control information to the Grid resources. 
The broker will have unique identification of all users on the Grid, based on 
a mapping of their “site code” and unique local username combined. The broker 
will have a unique identification code for each site participating in the Grid. The 
Grid directory structure is used to store user credentials and authorization 
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mappings. The broker stores some meta-data about sites in the Grid. This includes 
security information about a site, what authentication technology it makes use of, 
i.e. Kerberos, SSH, SSL, etc.  
 
6.2.2 Implementation Of A Broker 
 
The following section will provide more detail on the proposed broker’s logical 
structure. The broker provides elements to allow the single sign-on and delegation 
of user credentials. A resource can utilize other Grid resources on the user’s behalf 
(delegation). The broker should allow for authentication of users, resources, and 
processes and must support user-to-resource, resource-to-user, process-to-resource, 
and process-to-process authentication (Foster, Kesselman, 1998). For the purpose 
of providing such a complex authentication and authorization strategy, it is 
proposed the broker makes use of a “group policy” structure, in order to facilitate 
these needs. The structure consists of several elements: 
• Resource  
• Users 
• Owner 
• Groups 
• Privilege 
 
Figure 6.2: Simple diagram of group policy structure 
Resource 
User 1 
User 2 
User 3 
User 4 
   Group 1
      Read 
       Write 
   Group 2
      Read 
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Figure 6.2 is a graphical representation of how users interact with resources. 
Resources belong to participating sites in the Grid and are managed by their 
respective administrators. These administrators are defined as resource owners. 
Groups are defined and linked to a resource. One group can contain many users. A 
group then has a privilege to access the resource defined, one resource can have 
many groups linked to it. Only owners can assign access rights to resources. This 
simple paradigm can allow for complex authorization structures throughout the 
Grid and can cater for scalability. 
The process of defining user access credentials for all users on a Grid that 
can access a particular resource could be an administrative nightmare and not good 
practice, in terms of scalability. Within the proposed brokered approach, sites can 
define a standard set of access credentials or user logons, such as “Read”, “Write”, 
etc. These credentials can be seen as “local” proxy accounts, managed on the 
broker side. Access to the resource is monitored and all the accounting will occur at 
the broker. The broker will determine which local credential to invoke (or proxy to 
open), based on the requesting users access rights to the resource, which are stored 
and determined in the broker directory. 
A multi-layered administration strategy for the broker is required. 
Considering access to site resources is determined at the broker; the broker 
dynamically authenticates users to a resource. Site administrators need some level 
of control over who can and cannot access their resources, and what degree of 
access is granted to various parties. 
A brokered approach can provide scalable authentication and authorization 
to Grid environments, but it could also be seen as a central point of failure that 
could potentially bring down the entire Grid. There are a number of ways to combat 
this, including: 
• Redundant hardware (RAID, clustering, Network Interface Cards [NICs]) 
• Clustering 
• Site Replication 
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6.3 Elements Of The Grid Broker 
 
The goals of the broker are to provide a higher-level abstracted service for handling 
complex site-to-site authentication and user-based trust relationships within a Grid. 
Some requirements for providing a transparent user interaction on a Grid when 
utilizing resources from multiple sites were identified (Butler, et al, 2002; 
Nagaratnam, et al, 2002): authentication, authorization, single sign on, delegation, 
user-based trust relationships. This seeks to identify services a broker would utilize 
to support these security requirements; and how these services are at risk from 
attack when considering STRIDE.  
The following list provides a proposed set of components and services 
required by a broker to perform its desired tasks. Each service will be discussed in 
more detail in a subsequent section:  
• Authentication: Single sign-on allows a user to authenticate at the broker 
and use any resource available to him\her without requiring constant re-
authentication. 
• Authorization: Authorization services determine what levels of access 
(privilege elements) to Grid resources legitimately authenticated users 
possess.    
• Execution management: Execution management is an OGSA capability. In 
order to incorporate the benefits of the broker; execution management can 
be abstracted into the Common Grid Layer and handled by the broker as 
well. 
• Scheduling service: Scheduling services is another OGSA capability. 
Scheduling services are loosely coupled to execution management services 
(Foster, et al, 2006). For this reason scheduling services are abstracted to the 
broker as well. Values in security Group elements can be used for 
prioritizing access and execution management. This can be policy-based 
(rules-based) as well. 
• Network communication: Network communication services are not 
explicitly defined as part of the broker services, but it is necessary to 
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consider them. Almost all Grid communications occur over some networked 
medium. A broker can be used to identify network-transport layer security 
protocols (such as IPSec and SSL/TLS) in both incoming execution requests 
(SOAP messages) and in Information Services caches regarding security 
protocol requirements of resources to be accessed by the requests. 
• Storage: The broker will be required to store many different types of 
information. Although storage is not an explicit broker service it must 
implement directory services (user accounts, security groups, group policies, 
etc.) from a security. It will also provide information (OGSA Information 
Services)  regarding resources (in XML documents). 
 
6.3.1 Authentication 
 
The broker is responsible for negotiating communications between Grid 
participants. One of the primary functions of the broker is to provide a standardized 
method for Grid participants to authenticate to each other. As highlighted in 
previous sections, Grids are made up of heterogeneous environments. They 
typically comprise multiple physical organizations and administrative domains. 
Domains or sites often make use of incompatible technologies and platforms. The 
Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) defines a set of capabilities to allow 
diverse heterogeneous parties to communicate and share resources. However, there 
are no adequate solutions available to provide scalable authentication and 
authorization services which are required to form the basis of user-based trust 
relationships in a Grid system. This section will focus on how a broker could 
provide authentication services to heterogeneous parties participating in a Grid, and 
how the broker addresses the requirement of single sign-on capabilities in a Grid. 
Consider the following steps taken by the broker when authorizing a user to 
access a resource: 
1. A user provides the credentials needed to log onto the Grid. 
2. The user initiates a process that requires remote Grid resources. 
3. The user’s Grid credentials are tested against the resource’s global access-
control policy. 
Chapter 6: A Brokered Approach To OGSA Grid Security 
 69
4. The user’s rights to that resource are determined.  
5. If the user has sufficient rights, the Grid initiates the communication and 
provides that Grid resource with the correct level authentication.     
6. Broker passes the WS reference to the client, the interaction then becomes a 
direct interaction between the user and resource. 
A broker is intended to facilitate authentication services between 
heterogeneous parties. In previous sections (Section 6.1), several high-level Grid 
security needs were identified. A broker addresses the need for single sign-on. Once 
a user authenticates to the Grid (broker), the broker will maintain the equivalent of 
a “ticket” (as implemented in Kerberos) for that particular user. A ticket may be 
valid for a pre-configured period, i.e., 24 hours. The broker can then use the ticket 
on the user’s behalf to execute services required to complete a computation. This 
will allow the user to log onto the broker once, and not be prompted to resubmit 
his\her credentials every time a new resource is required to complete a task. 
However, for authentication to persist to the fabric level, the user or process’s 
credentials must be translated to that required by the fabric resources. The broker is 
able to affect this as a result of the knowledge-base possessed by the broker. GSI 
implements a system of proxy certificates, the function of which can be subsumed 
by a broker. 
 
6.3.2 Authorization 
 
Authorization as a security service within a Grid environment is defined as, “A 
service that evaluates policy rules regarding the decision to allow the attempted 
actions, based on information about the requestor (identity, attributes, etc.), the 
target identity, policy, attributes, etc.), and details of the request” (Welch, 
Siebenlist, Foster, Bresnahan, Czajkowski, Gawor, Kesselman, Meder, Pearlman, 
Tuecke, 2003). Within the context of this proposed Grid broker, a service requestor 
(Grid participant) will request the use of a Grid service. The broker will determine 
if the requestor can access the service based on the requestor’s defined rights to the 
service (access policy). The user’s rights to a resource are defined by the resource 
owner (target).  
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Current OGSA-based Grid implementations, such as the Globus toolkit, 
make use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to implement authorization assertions 
between Grid participants (Welch, et al, 2003). The proposed broker is not intended 
to replace the current implementations of Grid security. The broker merely abstracts 
this functionality to a higher level. This allows for greater flexibility and scalability 
in defining access control policies to Grid resources in a dynamic, multi-
institutional Grid environment. 
Authorization services are important to Grids. There must be mechanisms in 
place that will determine what Grid users can and cannot access, as well as to what 
degree they can access resources (read, write, etc). The proposed brokered approach 
manages all access control assertions (policies) on the Common Grid Layer. All 
access control is determined on a higher level of interaction than purely site-to-site 
assertions. 
The broker maintains a directory structure of all resources and users 
participating in the Grid. This directory structure stores all user access credentials 
to a resource. As highlighted in previous sections (section 6.2.2) resources have 
users and owners. Owners can specify access to the resource. Owners set the access 
control assertions to their resources. A resource owner will make a resource 
available to another organization or user base. When a user wishes to use a 
resource, the broker will test their authenticated credentials against their access 
rights to a resource. The broker will only grant access to that user if they have 
sufficient access to access the resource they wish to use.   
 
6.3.3 Execution Management 
 
Execution management is a key capability of the Open Grid Service Architecture 
(OGSA) (Foster, et al, 2006). Execution Management Services (OGSA-EMS) are 
concerned with the problems of instantiating and managing, to completion, units of 
work (Ibid). Execution management was discussed as an OGSA capability in 
section 3.2.2. In order for a brokered approach to be implemented within an OGSA 
context, the broker must consider how execution management would be affected if 
authentication and authorization are abstracted to a higher level. 
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For the purpose of this framework, execution management must be 
abstracted to the broker. The broker will be able to match a user request with 
resources. The proposed approach will allow the broker to have knowledge of the 
user’s access rights and resources available on the Grid. This allows the broker to 
effectively decide what resources a user is assigned when a request is made. 
 
6.3.4 Scheduling Services 
 
Scheduling services are linked to execution management services. The Grid job 
scheduler will be abstracted to the broker as well. This is in order to maintain 
consistency in the execution of jobs, and to ensure resources are not overloaded 
with work. This will allow broker to schedule jobs on the appropriate resources for 
a user request. The broker will be able to determine the type of resource needed to 
complete the requestor’s computation, i.e., processor requirements, storage 
requirements, etc. 
 
6.3.5 Network Communications 
 
Network communications are not explicitly defined as a requirement of the broker, 
but are implied due to the nature of the broker. All the communications that occur 
between the broker, users and resources are typically over some form of network. 
There are a wide range of network considerations when implementing a Grid 
broker. These considerations include: difference in link speed (or network latency), 
different protocols used by various Grid participants, and secure and reliable 
information exchange. 
Typically TCP\IP protocol is used to share information between Grid 
participants over a public network, such as the Internet. There are standard security 
technologies, which can be utilized to secure communications between parties, such 
as SSL, etc. However, a range of other protocols may be utilised. When 
implementing a broker these network requirements must be considered.  
 
 
 
Chapter 6: A Brokered Approach To OGSA Grid Security 
 72
6.3.7 Storage (Metadata and Information) 
 
The broker will require some storage area to store the directory and other 
information required for the Grid to function. 
 
6.4 Evaluation Of A Brokered Approach To STRIDE  
 
The following table maps the identified broker services to STRIDE. This section 
will discuss how each Grid service is at risk from the relevant STRIDE threat 
category (Depicted in table). 
 
Table 6.1: Applicable STIDE threat categories to broker services 
 Spoofing Tampering Repudiation Information 
Disclosure 
Denial 
of 
Service 
Escalation 
of 
privileges 
Authentication X      
Authorization X X X  X X 
Execution 
management 
    X  
Scheduling 
Services 
   X X  
Network 
communications
X X X X X  
Storage 
(Metadata and 
information) 
 X X X X  
 
6.4.1 Authentication 
 
OGSA Grid security is handled through WS-Security (WS-S) specification and 
Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI). X.509 Public Key Infrastructure is extended to 
support Grid authentication (Li, Cui, Tian, 2006). 
Grid participants authenticate to the Grid via network connections. Grids 
typically communicate over public networks, such as the Internet. Network 
authentication services are primarily at risk from spoofing attacks, especially over 
public networks. A hacker will make use of “man in the middle” attacks to intercept 
the network communication between the Grid participant and the broker (see 
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section 7.1.1.2). The hacker can obtain the users authentication credentials to gain 
access to the Grid. 
A number of standard security services can be employed to minimise the 
risk of hackers obtaining user credentials via “man in the middle” attacks. One such 
service is encryption. The contents of packets between communicating parties can 
be encrypted utilizing some method of Public\Private key encryption (PKI). The 
communication channel can be secured utilizing Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or any 
other method of communication encryption. 
 
6.4.2 Authorization 
 
Within the proposed broker approach, authorization requests are make to the 
broker, and the broker will determine a users rights, based on the access policy 
defined by the resource owner. The directory structure storing resource information 
and access policy information is sorted on the broker site. Authorization assertions 
in current Grid implementations are handled utilizing a X.509 based PKI 
infrastructure (Welch, et al, 2003).  
Authorization services within the proposed broker context are vulnerable to 
spoofing attacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and tampering. Escalation of 
privileges and repudiation are results of tampering. 
Authorization services are at risk of spoofing attacks in the same way 
authentication services are. Authorization information is shared between Grid 
participants over a network. This service is at high risk of “man in the middle” 
attacks. A common method to combat these attacks is the use of PKI. PKI allows 
for the protection of information, preserving its confidentiality, as well as 
protecting its integrity, by insuring the information was received from the correct 
party. 
An attacker can employ several methods to prevent the desired network 
packets with vital authorization information to not reach its destination. This attack 
method will “stall” the process between service requestor and service provider, 
possibly resulting in time outs, ultimately, preventing the service requestor to gain 
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access to the desired service. This form of attack is often a last ditch attempt by a 
hacker, if they cannot compromise the desired target.  
User access policies are stored on a directory within the broker. This 
directory is at a risk of being compromised by attackers. An attacker could gain 
access to the directory by compromising the server the service is hosted on. If this 
directory were to be compromised by an attacker, and the attacker alters the 
information within it. This could result in the escalation of user privileges, if a low 
access account is promoted to super-user status. The attacker could then delete the 
transaction logs for the service to hide his\her tracks, and this could result in 
repudiation. A typical method to secure this type of service is through a process of 
machine hardening (close un-used ports, firewalls, update system software, etc). 
 
6.4.3 Execution Management 
 
Execution management is a service hosted within the broker. This is in order to 
allow execution services to have access to authentication and authorization 
services, and to be accessed by scheduling services. This allows for the Grid to 
provide a more effective service to its users. Execution management shares similar 
vulnerabilities to the authorization service, due to the similarities in the services in 
terms of implementation. Execution management services are primarily vulnerable 
to denial-of-service attacks. Attackers will employ network or host denial of service 
methods against execution management services.  
 
6.4.4 Scheduling Services 
 
Scheduling services are integrated into execution management services. Scheduling 
services share the similar security concerns as execution management, due the 
nature of the service and its similarity in implementation to execution management. 
Scheduling services primary security concerns when compared to STRIDE include 
information disclosure, and denial-of-service (DoS). 
If the underlying server hosting the Grid scheduler is compromised, an 
attacker will have access to the Grid scheduler information. The scheduler handles 
and exchanges vast amounts of data. An attacker could compromise the scheduler 
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in order to obtain corporate secretes. In this event, the Grid scheduler becomes 
compromised or crippled in anyway. This could result in the Grid being unable to 
schedule user requests, ultimately resulting in denial-of-service. Machine hardening 
can be used to combat the compromise of the machine scheduler. 
 
6.4.5 Network Communication 
 
Network communications services are not an explicit component of the broker 
service. However, network communication services facilitate and support many of 
the broker’s services therefore, it must be considered. Network communications are 
vulnerable to spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure and denial-
of-service attacks. Typical methods employed by OGSA and Globus to secure 
network communications include encryption of the data exchanged between 
participants (X.509 PKI infrastructure); as well as the encryption of network 
communication pipes (VPNs, etc). 
 
6.4.6 Storage 
 
Storage services are not an explicit component of the broker service. However, like 
network communication services, storage services provide vital services to the 
broker. If storage services are compromised, the normal operation of the broker will 
be affected. Therefore, storage must be considered when evaluating the proposed 
broker’s security infrastructure. When evaluating storage services against STRIDE, 
it is vulnerable to the following threats tampering, repudiation, information 
disclosure, and denial-of-service. Standard measures to protect broker data include 
regular backups of data, putting in place redundant hardware (RAID, etc), or site 
replication (data replication). 
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6.5 Conclusion  
 
Security issues affecting the Common Grid Layer were identified. A brokered 
approach to providing Grid-wide authentication and authorization was discussed. 
This approach addresses the security needs of the Grid on the Common Grid Layer, 
which primary include authentication and authorization of Grid participants when 
accessing external sites to their own. Addressing authentication and authorization 
issues on the Common Grid Layer were found to address other key issues; such as 
single sign-on, delegation, and the forming of complex user-based trust 
relationships. The STRIDE model was discussed. Microsoft‘s STRIDE threat 
classification scheme was used to classify threats Grid services (as Web-based 
applications). Services required by the proposed broker were identified and 
discussed, and then compared against STRIDE for security vulnerabilities. 
 
The next chapter will discuss a security strategy for securing Grids at the Local 
Grid Layer. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Grid Resource Threat Modelling Methodology 
 
Chapter 6 discussed a Grid broker that can be utilized on the Common Grid Layer. 
The purpose of the broker is to facilitate high-level trust relationships between Grid 
participants. This chapter is concerned with the security of a Grid resource on the 
Local Grid Layer. The goal of this chapter is to discuss a generic threat-modelling 
technique. This threat-modelling technique can be used by Grid designers to secure 
Grid resources.  
To understand the importance of securing one’s Grid, it is important to 
understand the threats and impacts associated with insufficient security (Whitman, 
2003). Grids facilitate large-scale collaboration between globally dispersed parties 
with varying levels of trust between one another. Grids primarily operate over 
public network infrastructure, such as the Internet (Foster, 2000). Due to the open 
nature of the Internet, Grids are at a greater risk of being attacked compared to 
closed systems (systems behind a corporate firewall) (Surridge, Upstill, 2003). 
Attackers might employ a variety of methods to attack a Grid, but their actions can 
be grouped into a set of generic actions. STRIDE will be used in this chapter to 
categorize (group) attacker’s goals when attacking a Grid. STRIDE was discussed 
in chapter 5, section 5.2.1. 
The Local Resource Layer is concerned with the security challenges faced 
by a single Grid site. The single site could host one or many Grid resources. This 
layer is faced with more traditional information security challenges, such as 
operating system and network security. Grids are heterogeneous in nature and are 
implemented on a wide variety of hardware and software.  
Whitman identifies two components to a successful information security 
strategy, which can be applied to Grids. Firstly, one must know what the threats 
faced by a Grid are, and, secondly one must know the vulnerabilities of a Grid 
(Whitman, 2003).  
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This chapter will discuss the anatomy of an attack, that is, the generic 
methodology used by attackers when performing an attack. Knowing how an 
attacker performs his\her attacks against a Grid will better prepare security 
administrators when defining a Grid security strategy. A Grid resource threat-
modeling technique will be discussed. This technique will follow the generic steps 
of identifying threats to a Grid resource. STRIDE will be used as a basis for 
identifying threats to Grid resources. Once Grid threats have been identified, 
applying countermeasures to protect these resources will be discussed.  
To summarize, good information security strategy begins with knowing 
what one’s weaknesses or potential attack points are, as well the possible external 
threat agents that threaten one’s system (Grid) (Whitman, 2003). The goals of this 
chapter are to: 
• Identify a generic attack methodology (knowing one’s external threats), 
• Identifying a threat-modelling process Grid designers can use to identify 
their Grid assets and potential weaknesses (knowing one’s weaknesses), and 
• Discuss countermeasures that can be applied to Grid resources to minimize 
risk of attack. 
 
7.1 Threats and Threat Modelling 
 
Understanding the basic approach used by an attacker will better equip Grid 
designers to understand how their Grids are at risk from attacks, and how to best 
secure them. By thinking like attackers and being aware of their likely actions, one 
can be more effective when applying countermeasures to protect Grid systems 
(Meier, et al, 2003). This section will discuss a five-stage process generally 
employed by attackers when attacking an online Web-based system, such as a Grid. 
Microsoft (Ibid) identifies the basic five step attack approach generally used 
by attackers. This approach defines generic steps an attacker will need to perform in 
order to complete a successful attack. Not all steps are required in every instance. 
The steps in Meier et al’s attacker’s methodology are listed below, and figure 7.1 
shows a graphical representation of this process (Ibid): 
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• Survey and assess - This is the initial stage of the hacking process. The 
hacker will try to learn of possible servers and services on the network. The 
hacker will then try to find possible weaknesses and exploits them to try and 
gain access to the target machine. 
• Exploit and penetrate - Once the hacker completes the survey phase, the 
next step is to exploit and penetrate the target. The hacker will try to gain 
entry to the targeted Grid by exploiting a vulnerability discovered in the 
survey step of the process. Once the attacker gains entry, he\she will attempt 
to drop the attack payload. 
• Escalate privileges - Upon completing the attack and delivering the 
payload, the hacker will then attempt to gain administrative access to the 
Grid. 
• Maintain access - If the attacker successfully gains administrative 
privileges, he\she will try maintaining access to the compromised Grid. This 
will make future access easier. 
• Deny service - If the attacker is not successful in his\her attack, he\she will 
try launching a Denial of Service attack (DoS) against the targeted Grid. 
The purpose of this is to deny legitimate use of the service.  
Figure 7.1: Steps in a typical attack (Meier, et al, 2003, pg 15) 
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7.1.1 Survey and Assess 
 
This is the initial stage to an attack. The attacker will try and identify servers and 
nodes on the targeted network. Typically this is achieved by using packet sniffers¹ 
and ping sweep tools². Once potential targets are identified, the attacker will use a 
variety of tools to learn more about the target. Typical methods of learning about a 
target include port scanners and banner grabbers, among others.  
A port scan will show the attacker what ports are open, and what services 
are running on the target machine. Banner grabbers will show versions and vendor 
information of the services running on the machine. This is all potentially useful 
information to the attacker when determining if the machine is a good target.  
The attacker will then pick his\her target based on the information that has 
been gathered. The attacker has some criteria for the selection of a target. This is 
typically the attacker’s knowledge of weakness in the Grids software (vendor 
implementations of services and versions), or if he\she is pursuing a particular goal, 
i.e. theft of information, Denial-of-Service, information disclosure, etc.  
 
7.1.2 Exploit and Penetrate 
 
Once the attacker has identified a target, the next step is an attempt to exploit and 
penetrate the target. The attacker will exploit the targeted Grid via a vulnerability 
that he\she has identified in the ‘survey and assess’ stage. A variety of attacks can 
be employed by the hacker at this stage to compromise a Grid. Some notable 
attacks include: 
• Brute force: This method is used to guess passwords. Brute force attacks 
generate a list of every possible keystroke combination that can be entered 
by a user, and then passes them one by one to the targeted Grid 
authentication mechanism until a match is found.   
 
 
¹Packet sniffers are common tools used by attackers to intercept TCP/IP communications between 
communicating parties. Ethereal is a commonly used packet sniffing utility (ethereal, 2006). 
² A ping sweep (also known as an ICMP sweep) is a basic network scanning technique used to 
determine if a range of IP addresses map to live hosts (computers). 
Chapter 7: Grid Resource Threat Modelling Methodology 
 81
• Dictionary attack: This method works in a similar fashion to a brute force 
attack, but uses a set of predefined words to guess user credentials on a 
target machine. These lists of words are typically stored in a text file; they 
are typically digital versions of thorough commercial dictionaries. 
• Buffer overflow attacks: This method exploits bad coding in a Grid to 
execute malicious code on a target machine. A buffer overflow occurs when 
more data is passed to a program then it has made provision for in memory. 
This results in the code crashing and the undesired malicious code 
executing. 
• SQL injection: SQL injections exploit vulnerabilities in input validations of 
a Database Management System (DBMS). The result of SQL injection 
allows an attacker to run arbitrary code on the targeted remote database 
server. If applications do not validate their SQL queries to the DMBS, an 
attacker could insert undesired SQL statements within legitimate statements 
to execute undesired commands on the targeted machine. Underlying 
operating system commands could be executed as well as DBMS 
commands.  
• Cookie relay attacks: An attacker could use network monitoring software, 
such as a packet sniffer, to capture a legitimate user’s authentication cookie. 
Once the cookie is obtained the attacker will relay it back to the server and 
obtain access illegitimately. 
• Man in the middle attacks: The attacker ‘sits’ between legitimately 
communicating parties and utilizes network monitoring software, such as a 
packet sniffer, to intercept messages. The attacker will either save relevant 
information, such as authentication credentials, or alter the information to 
gain access to a Grid. 
A wide range of attacks and further variations of these attacks can be used by 
attackers to exploit and penetrate Grid systems.  
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7.1.3 Escalate Privileges 
 
Once the attacker has compromised the targeted Grid, the next stage is to try 
obtaining higher-level access. This is typically administrative-level access. The 
attacker will attempt to create an administrative-level account, or try to promote a 
compromised account, if it is not a higher-level access account already.   
Depending on the success of attempting to gain higher level access, the 
attacker will perform one of two actions. Either he\she will try maintaining access 
to the compromised Grid, or launching a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack against it. 
Denial-of-Service attacks deny legitimate users access to the Grid (see section 
7.1.5).  
 
7.1.4 Maintain Access 
 
If the attacker successfully obtains administrative access to the compromised Grid, 
the attacker will try to maintain access to that Grid. This allows the attacker to 
make future access to the Grid easier, and will make the process of clearing his\her 
tracks easier. Typically, the attacker will clear his\her tracks by deleting log entries. 
This results in non-repudiation. Non-repudiation prevents Grid security 
administrators knowing who performed what action.  
The attacker will, typically, plant a back-door application to maintain access 
to the compromised Grid. A back-door application is defined as “a hardware or 
software-based hidden entrance to a computer system that can be used to bypass the 
system’s security policies” (Microsoft, 2006). 
 
7.1.5 Deny Service 
 
If the attacker cannot successfully launch the desired attack against the targeted 
Grid, the last course of action would, typically, be to try denying legitimate users 
access to it. This is achieved through Denial-of-Service attacks. The most common 
method of these attacks is attacking the network connection between the service 
and its users. Internet-based applications, such as Grids, are at highly vulnerable to 
Denial-of-Service attacks (Houle, Weaver, 2001). 
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7.2 Threat Modelling Methodology 
 
“Knowing your systems weakness as well as the possible threats to your system is a 
first step to developing an appropriate security strategy” (Whitman, 2003). In 
chapter 5 STRIDE was introduced as a threat-classification scheme. A generic 
attack methodology often employed by hackers when attacking Grids was discussed 
in the previous section. The goal of this section is to discuss a threat-modelling 
process Grid designers and security administrators can apply to the Local Grid 
Layer. 
Threat modelling should be a constant in a Grid’s lifetime, and not just a 
consideration during the design phase of the System Development Life Cycle 
(SDLC). The two main reasons for this are (Meier, et al, 2003): 
1. It is impossible to identify all possible threats faced by a Grid in one go. 
2. Grids are rarely static and often change to meet their changing 
business\users requirements. 
 
7.2.1 Threat Modelling Principles 
 
The following six step threat modelling process can be applied to almost any 
application security strategy, but has particular relevance to Web-based applications 
and Grid systems. Consider the following steps discussed by Meier for securing 
Web-based information systems, such as Grids. (Meier, et al, 2003): 
1. Identify assets: Identify the assets associated with the Grid that must be 
protected. Grid assets could include databases or a specialized piece of 
hardware.  
2. Create an architecture overview: The architecture of the local Grid 
resource can be modelled using diagrams and tables. The following aspects 
of the resource should be identified: the services it is realised on; what sub-
systems it consists of; and what the trust boundaries that exist between the 
local Grid and its external Grid users are. 
3. Decompose the Grid: The purpose of decomposing the Grid is to identify 
the autonomous components of the Grid. These components include: 
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underlying hosts, networks, OGSA compatible components, etc. This 
exercise is the first step in identifying a local Grid resource security 
strategy. Profiling the components of the local Grid resource individually 
can help identify possible vulnerabilities to the Grid. 
4. Identify threats: During this step, Grid designers identify possible threats 
that could affect the local Grid resource. This step will require multiple 
parties within the Grid design and administration groups to co-operate with 
each other. An understanding of the composition of the Grid is required 
(Step 3), along with a working knowledge of STRIDE (in terms of relevant 
attack categories, see chapter 5). With this knowledge at hand and the 
relevant expertise available, team members can brainstorm and identify 
threats to the Grid resource effectively (Meier, et al, 2003).  
5. Document the threats: During this step, the threats identified in step 4 are 
documented, utilizing a common set template that defines a core set of 
attributes to be captured for each threat. It is good practice to utilize a 
common template as this practice establishes a common framework for all 
parties involved. This will allow for better communication of the threats. 
6. Rate the threats: Once the threats have been formally documented, key 
members of the Grid implementation process should rate them. Threats 
should be rated and prioritized from most significant to least. A simple 
weighting process can be used. The most common criterion for rating 
threats is “the probability of the threat against the likelihood of attack”. 
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 2. Create an architecture overview
 3. Decompose the application
 4. Identify the the threats
 5. Document the threats
 6. Rate the threats
 1. Identify assets
 
Figure 7.2: Six step threat modelling process (Meier, et al, 2003, pg 47) 
 
Figure 7.2 depicts a graphical representation of the process. Successful completion 
of a step requires all its prerequisite steps to be completed. The output of this 
process should be an easily understood document or set of documents. The local 
Grid resource administrative team should use these documents as a common 
vocabulary. These documents identify what the threats are that need to be 
addressed, and how they will be addressed. The following sections will discuss the 
steps in the six-step threat-modelling process in more detail, when it is applied to a 
Grid. 
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7.2.1.1 Identify Assets 
 
Firstly, all assets that make up the Grid resource need to be identified. This could 
include databases, hardware assets, storage resource, computational assets, etc. 
Identifying these assets will provide the local Grid resource security administrators 
with a clear picture of what the valuable components of the Grid resource are, as 
well as those that would have a financial figure associated with them if 
compromised, lost, or if contents were divulged to unwanted third parties.    
Grids are multilayered structures. Each layer must be considered when 
identifying the assets that make up a single Grid resource. These layers include: 
• The hosting environment,  
• The underlying operating system,  
• The Grid fabric,  
• The OGSA middleware and Web-services, and 
• Grid applications. 
 
Figure 7.3: Layers of a Grid Resource 
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The hosting environment is primarily responsible for supporting the Grid 
service. OGSA defines the semantics of a Grid resource instance: how it is created, 
how it is named, how its lifetime is determined, how to communicate with it, etc 
(Foster, et al, 2002). However OGSA does not define what the Grid resource does, 
or how it performs its intended operations. OGSA does not address issues of 
implementing a programming model, programming language, implementation tools 
or execution environment (Ibid). This is the role of the hosting environment. Web-
services are the driving technology for OGSA Grid functionality. Web-services are 
easily implemented and maintained in container or component-based hosting 
environments, such as J2EE, Web-sphere, SUN ONE, or .NET framework (Ibid). 
These environments abstract the complexities of implementing Web-service 
components. 
The primary purpose of the underlying operating system is to support the 
chosen hosting environment in the same fashion that the hosting environment 
supports OGSA services. Hosting environments require an underlying platform to 
support their functions. Hosting environments provide container functionality, but 
cannot manage hardware, or interact with system resources directly. 
The Grid fabric is simply any native service or component that is exposed 
to the Grid via OGSA middleware. The Grid fabric could consist of specialized 
hardware, or any form of software, exposed to the Grid via OGSA interfaces, to 
provide computing or storage resources to Grid users. OGSA manages the 
publishing and discovery of these services. 
OGSA middleware and Web-services address heterogeneity in distributed 
Grid systems. OGSA based middleware, such as the Globus Toolkit (See chapter 3, 
section 3.3), provide uniformity through a standard set of interfaces to the 
underlying resources (Globe, De Roure, 2002). 
Grid applications are the applications that operate within the Grid in a 
virtual organization (VO) context. Grid applications are the end result of all the 
lower-level layers and aspects of Grid architecture working together. 
When identifying all Grid resource assets, the above mentioned layers must 
be considered. A methodical approach to identify assets utilizing the layers of a 
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Grid resource discussed is recommended. It is recommended Grid resource 
managers utilize the layers discussed in this section as part of a methodical top-to-
bottom approach to identifying Grid assets.  
 
7.2.1.2 Create an architecture overview 
 
The goal of this step is to document the Grid resources assets. An architecture 
diagram depicting the local Grid architecture and the components that makes up the 
Grid resource (OS components, DBMSs, Globus middleware and tools, OGSA 
compatible components,  
etc), as well as how these components interact with each other to provide a service, 
are the primary output of this step. 
Identifying how the Grid resource is meant to be used could provide some 
insight into how it is not meant to be used (Meier, et al. 2003). During this step, 
Grid resource designers and security administrators should identify how the Grid-
resource users access the assets identified in step 1. This will provide greater 
understanding on how the assets could be misused. 
A high-level Grid architecture diagram should be drawn up. The diagram 
should highlight the components and structure of the Grid resource. Depending on 
the complexity of the Grid resource and its implementation, multiple architecture 
documents might be drawn up. Each of these documents could focus on specific 
areas within the overall picture. Figure 7.4 shows an example of a high-level Grid 
resource architecture diagram. 
 
Figure 7.4: Simple example of a Grid architecture diagram 
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Technologies used in the Grid resource implementation should be identified 
on the architecture diagrams. The process of listing and identifying the technologies 
and platforms utilized in the composition of the Grid resource will allow for the 
identification of technology-specific threats. This will possibly help identify the 
best mitigation techniques, patches, updates, etc. A list of technologies could 
simply be listed in a table, as shown in table 7.1 below: 
 
Table 7.1: Example of a list of Grid technologies 
Component Grid resource layer Implementation details 
J2EE Hosing environment Underlying runtime 
environment. 
Globus toolkit, version 4 OGSA middleware Implementation of OGSA 
compatible interfaces  
 
The goal of this step is to: 
• Identify what service(s) the Grid resource expose, or make available to the 
VO. 
• Diagrams and documentation of the local Grid architecture. 
• Identify the technologies utilized in the implementation of the Grid 
resource. 
 
7.2.1.3 Decompose the application 
 
This step requires Grid resource managers to logically breakdown the Grid 
resource. This is for the purpose of defining a security profile. Breaking down the 
Grid into its aggregate components will help the Grid resource managers identify 
the vulnerabilities faced by individual components. Important considerations when 
decomposing the Grid resource are: identifying trust boundaries, dataflow, entry 
points, and identifying segments of privileged code. 
Identifying the Grid resource trust boundaries requires the relationship 
between components, assets, and users to be explicitly clarified. The path to assets 
must be identified from the user interaction perspective (what mechanisms are in 
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place to protect assets) as well as how a user’s request is handled from the first 
component in the interaction, to the lowest-layer protected component\asset. 
The identification of the dataflow can be done concurrently with the 
identification of trust boundaries. Dataflow is the path taken by data from 
origination to destination that includes all nodes through which the data travels. The 
simplest way to identify the flow of data within a Grid resource is to start at the 
highest level of user interaction. This is, typically, the proxy between the local Grid 
resource and Grid broker. Dataflow diagrams (DFD) can be drawn up to show the 
flow of data in the Grid resource. Dataflow diagrams are Unified Modelling 
Language (UML) diagrams, typically used to depict the interaction of components 
in a system. It is out of the scope of this research to explain how dataflow diagrams 
are drawn up. However there are many good UML resources available (refer to 
“System analysis and design” by Kendall and Kendall (2002)). Figure 7.5 depicts a 
high-level example of a typical Grid resource DFD. 
 
 
Figure 7.5: an example of a simple DFD 
 
Entry points to the Grid resource are potential points of entry for attackers. 
Appropriate “gatekeepers” should be identified for entry points (Meier, et al, 2003). 
Firewalls implementing well-defined access-control policies are the most widely 
implemented “gatekeepers”. 
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The privileged code segments are the restricted functionality area of the 
Grid fabric. These code segments perform computations for service requestors, but 
are never accessed directly by the requestor. Management services defined in the 
middle layer (service layer) of OGSA are also considered privileged code segments 
(Foster, et al, 2006). During this step, the following must be performed: 
• Identify trust boundaries within the Grid resource. 
• Identify the dataflow from when a request comes via the common layer 
broker. 
• Identify all possible entry points to the Grid resource. 
• Identify the privileged code segments, both in the Grid fabric and the OGSA 
middle layer. 
 
7.2.1.4 Identify the threats 
 
Based on all the information collected collectively from previous steps in the threat 
modelling process combined with working knowledge of STRIDE, one can begin to 
identify threats that face the local Grid resource(s). 
The STRIDE model to classify threats was discussed in chapter 5. STRIDE 
allows Grid designers to have a checklist of possible attacker goals. STRIDE 
defines six threat categories (Meier, et al, 2003). Each threat category can be used 
as a checklist of attacker goals or methods when attacking a Grid (Spoofing, 
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial-of-Service, and Elevation 
of Privileges). Assessing vulnerabilities to Grid assets based on the simple criteria 
of what the attacker’s intentions and goals are, is a less time consuming and 
cheaper process than identifying all known vulnerabilities and available exploits for 
the underlying technologies the Grid resource is built on.  
Grid assets need to be analyzed for susceptibility to the STRIDE threat 
categories. In step 1 (Identify assets), the assets that make up the Grid were 
identified. Five layers of a Grid resource were discussed (the hosting environment, 
the underlying operating system, the Grid fabric, the OGSA middleware and Web-
services, and Grid applications). The roles of these layers were discussed. This step 
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required the identification of threats to assets belonging to all layers of a Grid 
resource.  
STRIDE was used to abstract an attacker’s intentions into six attack 
categories. The properties of a Grid resource can also be abstracted in a similar 
fashion. Grid resource layers can have primarily one of three risk profiles, but may 
be vulnerable to threats from another threat profile. These profiles include: 
• Network threats 
• Host threats 
• Application threats 
Network threats are direct threats to the Grids network infrastructure. Grid 
network threats are also concerned with the attacks that are carried out against a 
Grid, using the network communication links between participating sites as the 
primarily attack vehicle.  
Host threats are directed against the system software the Grid is hosted 
on\built on. This includes all operating systems, hosting environments, Database 
Management Systems (DBMSs). 
Application threats are the threats faced by Grid applications. Grid 
applications are the high-level applications built on the lower-level building blocks 
described in this section. 
Table 7.2 provides a checklist of all previously identified Grid resource 
layers. Each layer has one ore more threat profiles, and these profiles are ticked in 
the appropriate column. It is interesting to note all layers are vulnerable to host-
related threats. 
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Table 7.2: Table of Grid resource layers and Grid threat profiles 
Grid resource layer Network 
threats 
Host 
threats 
Application 
threats 
Hosting environment  X X 
Underlying operating 
system 
 X  
Grid fabric X X  
OGSA middleware  X X 
Grid applications X X X 
 
When identifying threats to the Grid, consideration must be made to the 
following general Grid-resource threat profiles: 
• Network threats 
• Host threats 
• Grid application threats 
 
7.2.1.5 Document the threats 
 
When documenting threats faced by the local Grid resource, standard templates 
must be used. Templates must contain attribute information about the threat, and 
any assumptions made. Utilizing standard templates makes communicating threats 
to all members of the Grid resource managers easier. It provides a common 
framework of understanding.  
 
7.2.1.6 Rate the threats 
 
At this stage there should be lists of possible threats faced by each aggregate Grid 
resource component. The next step is to rate these threats in order of danger they 
pose to the Grid resource. This process is known as risk assessment (Whitman, 
Mattord, 2003, pg140). It might not be financially or logistically viable to address 
all the possible threats identified (Meier, et al, 2003). Some threats might be 
ignored as the possibility of their occurring and the potential payload would be 
minimal. 
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A common weighting scheme can be used to rate a threat. Based on the 
threats score and danger it poses, it can be dealt with accordingly (Meier, et al, 
2003; Whitman, Mattord, 2003). The risk of a threat can be expressed as Risk = 
Probability * Damage Potential.  
The probability factor in the above calculation is the likelihood a particular 
vulnerability could be exploited by attackers. Grid resource managers should 
provide a rating of the possibility of a threat occurring. The rating can be expressed 
as a numeric value from 1-10. A value of ‘1’ indicates the threat is not very likely 
to be exploited, and ‘10’ indicates the threat will almost certainly be exploited.  
The damage potential factor depicts a numeric representation of how 
valuable the asset is to the Grid. Damage potential can be expressed as a numeric 
value from 1-10, similarly to probability. A value of ‘1’ would indicate if the asset 
was to be compromised, the Grid would not notice the effects or the value of 
replacing it are minimal. However, a rating of ‘10’ indicates if the asset was to be 
compromised or lost, the reputations would be considerable and noticeable. 
The two values are multiplied in the risk calculation. Once this is done for 
all identified threats, the prominent threats will be identified and ranked. A risk 
rating of ‘100’ indicates the risk to be clear and present. If it were to be exploited, it 
would result in noticeable losses. A risk rating of ‘1’ indicates minimal importance 
of the risk. A list of the risks can be made from order of significant to least 
significant, i.e., from 100 to 1. The process of identifying threats is an iterative 
process. It must be performed periodically (Meier, et al, 2003, pg 65; Whitman, 
Mattord, 2003; Surridge, Upstill, 2003). Once the risks have been rated from 
significant to least significant, a process of identifying controls to mitigate the 
effects needs to be undertaken.  
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7.3 Applying Countermeasures To Grid Threats 
  
In the previous section, a six-step threat-modelling technique was discussed (Meier, 
et al, 2003; Whitman & Mattord, 2003). This threat-modelling technique was 
adapted to identify threats faced by Grids. It was discovered the primary output of 
the threat-modelling exercise is to identify the most pertinent threats to the Grid 
resource. This output is achieved by identifying the threats to the Grid resource; and 
then rating these threats. Threats are rated according to probability of their 
occurring and the damage potential of a threat, if it was to be exploited. Once all the 
pertinent threats have been rated in order of most impactful, to least impactful, Grid 
resource managers must assign effective countermeasures to these threats. 
These threats were identified from the perspective of an attacker with the 
STRIDE threat categories as possible outcomes. STRIDE can be applied as a 
method to identify countermeasures as well. Each threat category described by 
STRIDE has a corresponding set of countermeasure techniques that should be used 
to reduce risk (Meier, at al, 2003). Meier defines a general table of countermeasures 
for each STRIDE category. The following table has been adapted specifically for 
the Grid environment: 
 
Table 7.3: A list of countermeasures for STRIDE threats to a Grid resource 
(Meier, et al, 2003, pg 17-18) 
Threat Countermeasure 
Spoofing (user identity) • Use strong authentication 
• Encrypt or hash secrets (passwords, etc) 
• Encrypt credentials when they are sent over a 
network connection 
• Protect authentication tickets with Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL) 
Tampering (with data) • Use data hashing  
• Use digital signatures 
• Use strong authentication 
• Use tamper resistant protocols over 
Chapter 7: Grid Resource Threat Modelling Methodology 
 96
communication links 
• Secure communication links with protocols 
that provide message integrity 
Repudiation • Use secure audit trails 
• Use digital signatures 
Information Disclosure • Use strong authorization 
• Use strong encryption 
• Secure communication links with protocols 
that provide message confidentiality 
• Do not store secrets in plain text 
Denial-of-Service • Use bandwidth throttling techniques 
• Validate and filter inputs  
Elevation of Privileges • Follow the principles of least privileged use 
• Use lest privileged credentials to run services 
 
The following section will discuss a few countermeasures relevant to each 
STRIDE threat category. This section will provide Grid resource managers with 
some background and understanding of what countermeasures are currently 
available and in use. 
 
7.3.1 Security Services 
 
7.3.1.1 Strong authentication  
 
X.509 public key certificates are commonly used in Grid implementations for 
providing authentication between parties. The Globus toolkit (discussed in chapter 
3, section 3.3) implements X.509 security services in the Grid Security 
Infrastructure (GSI) portion of the toolkit (Welch, Foster, Kesselman, Mulmo, 
Pearlman, Tuecke, Gawor, Meder, Siebenlist, 2004). 
When utilizing X.509 certificates as an authentication mechanism between 
distributed parties within a Grid, a certification authority (CA) can be used to issue 
certificates to Grid users. A certification authority is not always required, virtual 
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organizations can make use of their own certification service. Certification 
authorities are trusted third parties that issue Internet users (or Grid users) with 
digital certificates to verify who they are to other Internet (Grid) users. Certification 
authorities rely on a complex hierarchy of trust relationships between each other to 
maintain a state of universal trust (Schneier, 2000, pg 232-233). 
X.509 certificates provide Grids with the flexibility to allow an entity to 
trust another organization’s certification authority (CA), without requiring that the 
rest of its organization do so or requiring reciprocation by the trusted CA (Welch, et 
al, 2004). This feature allows for complex inter-organizational authentication. 
 
7.3.1.2 Hashing 
 
Hashing provides a means to check the integrity of information transmitted over 
unsecured and un-trusted mediums (Krawczyk, Bellare, Canetti, 1997). Hashing is 
the process of using a mathematical algorithm against data to produce a numeric 
value that is representative of that data. Typically a “secret key” is used between 
parties to hash data transmitted over un-trusted networks. MD5 and SHA-1 are two 
of the most popular hashing algorithms available. MD5 is the most commonly used 
hashing algorithm in Grid environments (Humphrey, Thompson, 2005).  
 
7.3.1.3 Encryption 
 
Encryption is a security service that ensures the confidentiality of data. Encryption 
is the process of transforming “plaintext” into “ciphertext”. Ciphertext means text 
that is hidden but can be restored to the original plaintext by another algorithm (the 
invocation of which is called decryption) (Humphery, Thomposon, 2005). Two 
common encryption methods are through the use of “symmetric” and “asymmetric” 
encryption algorithms.   
Symmetric algorithms use the same key to encrypt and decrypt a message. 
Both the sender and receiver in this instance share the same key. In contrast, 
asymmetric algorithms make use of two keys to encrypt and decrypt messages. 
Each participant has two keys, a public key and a private key. Due to this, 
asymmetric encryption is often referred to public-key cryptography. The public key 
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is made publicly available. This key is used by other users to encrypt messages to 
the owner of the key. Only the user’s private key (which is kept secret) can decrypt 
the message encrypted with the same user’s corresponding public key. 
Symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms are used in combination to 
protect Grid information. Typical usage of encryption in Grids involves the data in 
transit to be encrypted utilizing a symmetric encryption algorithm, such as AES 
(NIST, 2001). Symmetric encryption algorithms are stronger mathematical 
algorithms. They are harder to crack (cracking is the process of overcoming 
protection mechanisms in software or computer systems [Wikipedia, 2006]), and 
have less system overhead when encrypting and decrypting messages. The 
symmetric key is then encrypted utilizing an asymmetric algorithm, such as RSA 
(Rivest, Shamir, Adleman, 1978). The sender’s asymmetric private key is used to 
encrypt the symmetric key, and then the recipient’s public key is used to encrypt 
the message. The encrypted message is then sent to the recipient, the recipient uses 
the relevant keys to decrypt the message and obtain the symmetric key. This 
concept is the basis for digital signature implementations.  
As discussed in section 7.3.1.1 Grids primarily implement X.509 digital 
certificates to perform authentication services. 
 
7.3.1.4 Tamper-resistant communication protocols 
 
The most commonly used network communication suit of protocol is TCP/IP. 
TCP/IP was designed with connectivity in mind, a goal it has achieved. However, 
TCP/IP is susceptible to tampering attacks. Security was not a concern when the 
protocol was designed. There are a number of inherent security flaws in the 
protocol (Bellovin, 1989). 
The primary communication protocol used over the Internet is TCP/IP. The 
Internet is made up of a number of interconnected devices, called routers. Routers 
determine the path IP packets take from their point of origin (sender) to their 
destination (receiver). As packets pass from router to router, their contents are open 
to anyone to read (Schneier, 2000). IP packets not only contain fragments of the 
data communicated between partied, but sender and recipient information as well. 
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Attackers can obtain this information and use it for malicious purposes as discussed 
in previous sections (Spoofing attacks, man-in-the middle attacks, etc).  
Even though the TCP/IP has many security flaws, it is still the most widely 
implemented network communication protocol suite. It might not be feasible to 
remove TCP/IP support from Grid implementations in favour for another more 
secure communication protocol. It might be more feasible to use secure 
communication protocols that can be implemented as an extra layer on top of 
TCP/IP. 
 
7.3.1.5 Secure communication protocols 
 
Secure communication protocols provide confidentiality and integrity to network 
communications over insecure networks, such as the Internet. A common public 
key authentication protocol used in Grids is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
protocol (Dierks, Rescorla, 2004). The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) porting of 
the Globus toolkit is built on top of the TLS protocol (Humphrey, Thompson, 
2005).  There are many other possible secure protocols that can be used, but this 
section will focus on TSL as Globus is the most widely implemented Grid 
middleware.  
TSL is derived from the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) version 3 protocol 
(Frier, Karlton, Kocher, 1996). TSL makes use of X.509 public key certificates 
(discussed in section 7.3.1.1) to authenticate the communication requestor.  
X.509 digital certificates are used in conjunction with TLS; a X.509 
certificate is presented as an authentication token. Once the party is verified 
(authenticated) by the token, the party is challenged using the TLS handshake 
protocol to prove its knowledge of the private key associated with the public key in 
the certificate (Humphery, Thomposon, 2005). After the party has been 
successfully verified, the communication channel is secured so only the 
authenticated parties can communicate over it. This ensures confidentiality and 
integrity over insecure communication links, such as the Internet.  
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7.3.1.6 Auditing and accounting services 
 
Auditing and accounting services provide non-repudiation to Grid implementations. 
Non-repudiation prevents a user or attacker from denying he\she had performed an 
action. Audit records of performed operations provide traceability in the event of a 
threat or breach (Ramakrishnan, 2004). In order for accounting services to be 
accurate, Grids must support two requirements each Grid user needs a unique 
identity across the Grid; and there must be adequate authentication services in place 
to ensure users are correctly authenticated.  
However, there are two challenges when implementing Grid-wide auditing 
and accounting. These challenges are: the heterogeneity of Grids; that sites might 
implement incompatible accounting solutions (Windows event logs, UNIX\LINUX 
Syslog, etc); and accounting information in Grids is dispersed. This makes 
correlating logs and audit files difficult (Ibid).     
A possible solution to these challenges was discussed in chapter 6. A broker 
could be utilized to provide unique identities to all Grid users, provide 
authentication services, and single-site coherent user audit and accounting 
information.  
 
7.3.1.7 Digital signatures 
 
Digital signatures services provide Grids with confidentiality, integrity and 
authorization. Digital signatures are implemented utilizing public key encryption 
(discussed in section 7.3.1.3). Grid middleware, such as the Globus toolkit 
primarily make use of X.509 certificates for digitally signing messages passed 
between Grid participants (X.509 certificates were discussed in section 7.3.1.1). 
The use of digital signatures provides a number of key security services to 
Grid implementations. Digitally signing communications between Grids at a 
message level provides end-to-end security between communicating Grid 
participants (Nagaratnam, et al, 2002). Digital signatures are widely used in Grid-
authentication strategies (discussed in section 7.3.1.1). 
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7.3.1.8 Bandwidth throttling 
 
Bandwidth-throttling security services primarily ensure availability to Grids. 
Bandwidth-throttling techniques have two purposes in Grid environments.  Firsly, 
they are used to ensure policy-driven Quality-of-Service (QoS). This method works 
by assigning a priority rating to types of network traffic; less important traffic is 
throttled: this gives more important traffic preference on the “wire”. Another more 
widely used application of bandwidth throttling is to protect against network-based 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Bandwidth-throttling services are available with 
most current network infrastructure equipment (routers, switches, network interface 
cards [NICs]), and are supported in most modern network-enabled operating 
systems. 
 
7.3.1.9 Input validation 
 
Input-validation services provide Grids with integrity. Input-validation mechanisms 
protect against buffer overflow, SQL injection, and other input-based attacks. It 
cannot be implemented utilizing a technology. It has to be build into the Grid 
service at a code level.  
Meier describes some guide lines to be considered when adding input 
validation at a Grid resource level (Meier, et al, 2003): 
• Developers must assume all input is malicious, 
• A centralized approach must be utilized, 
• Developers must not rely on client-side (requestor) validation, and 
• A “constrain, reject, and sanitize” input approach must be adopted.  
Meier suggests, “Input validation starts with a fundamental supposition that 
all input is malicious until proven otherwise” (Meier, et al, 2003). Input from 
outside the Grids resource trust boundary must be validated.  
Utilizing a centralized approach will make implementing input validation 
easier. For example, input validation could be handled by a single set of libraries. 
This approach ensures validation is applied consistently across the Grid resource 
(Meier, et al, 2003). 
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Input validation must occur on the Grid resource, and not rely on clients 
(service requestors) to perform input validation. The client validation model 
assumes input received by the Grid resource is already validated. An attacker could 
bypass the mechanism on the client side to send malicious invalidated input to the 
Grid resource. 
A preferred approach to performing input validation is to constrain inputs 
that are allowed by the Grid, at design time of the Grid resource. When the Grid 
resource is deigned developers should know what input the Grid will expect. It is 
easier to allow a finite set of known inputs, rather then trying to identify a wider 
range of illegal inputs. However, for defence in-depth, known malicious inputs can 
be rejected and then attempts to “sanitize” the input data can be made (Ibid).  
 
7.3.1.10 Least-privileged use model 
 
The least-privileged use model provides Grids with authorization. Least-privileged 
use is defined as, “A well-known principle in computer security that states that each 
entity should only have the minimal privilege needed to accomplish its assigned 
role and no more” (Welch, et al, 2003). Welch reports a least-privileged model is 
implemented in the Globus toolkit version 3 (GT 3), and newer revisions. When 
exposing the Grid fabric to Grid users, this model can be used to similar effect.  
Public facing services should have minimal or no privileges; this will reduce 
the impact if they were to be compromised. The attacker will have not advanced in 
the attack.  
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7.4. Conclusion 
 
Two essential requirements to a successful security plan were identified. Firstly, 
Grid resource managers must know the threats their Grid faces, and secondly, the 
Grid’s vulnerabilities must be identified. This chapter identified a generic attack 
methodology utilized by attackers. This attack methodology provides Grid resource 
managers with some insight into how an attacker will attack a Grid. A six-step 
threat-modelling process was proposed. This process was adapted for Grids, and 
utilized STRIDE to categorize Grid threats and attacker goals when attacking a 
Grid resource. The threat-modelling process discussed can be utilitized by Grid 
resource managers when identifying threats to Grid resources on the Local Grid 
Layer. The threat-modelling process outlined a top-down methodical approach to 
securing Grid resources on the Local Grid Layer.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation proposed a security framework towards holistic Grid security. 
This security framework proposed two abstract layers of Grid security for 
consideration. The first layer was concerned with high level political Grid security 
issues. These issues included authentication, authorization, and the creation and 
maintenance of complex trust relationships between Grid participants. This layer 
was identified as the Common Grid Layer.  
The second layer was concerned with securing the lower level Grid 
resources. Grid resources are often build on heterogeneous infrastructure; thus, 
prescribing a Grid security strategy is particularly challenging. This layer was 
identified as the Local Resource Layer. The STRIDE threat classification scheme 
was introduced and discussed. STRIDE is an acronym (Spoofing, Tampering, 
Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial-of-Service, Elevation of privileges) 
for popular security threats faced by distributed applications, including Grid 
Services. STRIDE was used extensively in the definition of the holistic Grid 
framework discussed in this research. 
It was suggested that the Grid security challenges on the Common Grid 
Layer could be solved by utilizing a brokered approach to facilitate trust 
relationships between Grid participants. The brokered approach utilizes a central 
abstracted software component in the Grid, which maintains a directory of 
legitimate Grid users, Grid resources, and the authorization (access control) 
mappings of users to resources. Implementing a brokered approach addresses some 
security concerns identified in Chapter 6; e.g. a broker could provide: single-sign 
on authentication to Grid users, strong and coherent authentication, delegation of 
user credentials, coherent accounting and auditing, and facilitation of dynamic 
complex user-based trust relationships. The aspects (components and services) to 
make a broker possible in an OGSA-based Grid were discussed. These aspects were 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 105
individually evaluated against STRIDE for possible vulnerabilities to STRIDE 
threat categories.  
A generic threat modeling process applicable to Grid resources was 
investigated. This threat modeling process is generic enough to be applicable to the 
heterogeneous nature of Grid resource implementations, but takes into account Grid 
specific constraints. The threat modeling chapter identified two general 
requirements to satisfy a Grid resource security strategy. These requirements are, 
firstly, threats to the Grid need to be identified, and secondly, the individual Grid 
services vulnerabilities need to be identified. The generic anatomy of an attack was 
discussed. It was found that combining a working knowledge of STRIDE, 
understanding the anatomy of an attack, and having knowledge of the Grid resource 
assets allowed for a suitable framework to be arrived at. 
 A six step threat modeling process was adapted to Grids. This threat 
modeling process provides a means to identify the vulnerabilities to Grid resources. 
Once threats to the Grid resource were identified, a number of countermeasures 
were discussed.  
Addressing security requirements in each of these two layers of Grid 
security provided a holistic framework for building secure Grids.  
 
8.1 Revisiting The Problem Statement 
 
This dissertation addressed security concerns in OGSA based Grids. A 
holistic framework to Grid security was required.  
It is contended that a brokered approach to ensuring interoperability in 
security services in an OGSA Grid context is very feasible. Other broker-mediated 
functions were also made secure through the security framework suggested. By 
abstracting a layer of security services beyond the local fabric level, a system of 
mapping between client systems, the broker system and resource/fabric systems 
could ensure Grid-wide security interoperability and Grid-Infrastructure level 
management. The efficacy of this framework depends largely on the broker being 
aware of all systems in a granular fashion, e.g. what security mechanisms are 
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employed, what the principals’ credentials are and how they are presented in each 
system, etc. 
A comprehensive means for applying threat-modelling in an ongoing 
fashion to protect Grid resources at the fabric level is also suggested in chapter 7. 
 
8.2 Shortcomings Of The Framework 
 
Grids are still a new and dynamic field of study. There is still a lot of work to be 
done in all areas of Grid research, particularly Grid security. The OGSA 
specification is still under review and modification, while the Globus Toolkit is 
under constant modification by the Globus community. 
The brokered approach to Grid security proposed in this dissertation 
(Chapter 6) can only really serve as a set of recommendations to Grid middleware 
communities.  
 
8.3 Future Work  
 
Grids research is constantly changing. New standards are being defined, while older 
ones are under constant review. With that said, the area of discourse should be 
thoroughly reevaluated in the event of future work on the model proposed in this 
dissertation. There are two primary areas this research can be taken further. 
Firstly, the proposed broker to interoperable Grid security (proposed in 
Chapter 6) can be incorporated into currently available Grid middleware. The 
Globus Toolkit is an open source project. The Globus Toolkit could be used as a 
test basis to implement a basic prototype to practically evaluate the broker. 
Secondly, the model could be extended to include Grid specific 
countermeasures   to threats faced by the Local Resource Layer. These 
countermeasures would have to be identified and researched. 
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8.4 Final Word 
 
The Grid security field is still a new area of research. With that said, the outcome of 
this research is not intended to be a final ‘set in stone’ solution, but rather it is the 
hopes of the author that it will provide a foundation for future efforts in this area.  
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ABSTRACT 
The need for organisations to share data and collaborate on a large scale with 
geographically dispersed parties has increased dramatically in recent years. Grid 
Services allow for large scale collaboration between geographically-dispersed 
parties running diverse hardware and software platforms, over public networks such 
as the Internet. Grid Services are an evolution of Web Service technology and other 
open, platform-independent standards. Current research efforts have been 
undertaken to standardize grid implementations. With the efforts of the Global Grid 
Forum (GGF) and other interested parties, the Globus Toolkit has been developed. 
The focus of this paper is to define a holistic security strategy for implementing 
Globus-based Grids. 
The Globus Toolkit is an open source software initiative, providing a set of 
tools and a platform for grid developers to build onto. The Toolkit is currently the 
de facto standard for Grid Service implementations, and is in its fourth major 
revision GT4 (Globus Toolkit version 4). The Globus Toolkit consists of a number 
of core components for implementing grids; the component of interest to this 
research is the Globus Security Infrastructure (GSI). This research looks at a 
layered approach to securing grids, making use of a defence-in-depth approach. The 
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focus is on the Globus Toolkit and GSI, local hardware and software configurations 
for remote sites, and communications (i.e. TCP/IP stack, RMI, RPC, etc). The 
STRIDE model will be used to provide a base for understanding hackers attack 
methodologies and threats faced by modern Grids. 
KEY WORDS: 
Grid Security, Globus, Brokered Grids, STRIDE, Grid interoperability  
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A BROKERED APPROACH TO INTEROPERABLE 
SECURITY IN OGSA-BASED GRID SYSTEMS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Due to a number of factors, grid computing has gained in popularity and 
application. To date many distributed computing paradigms exist, such as Common 
Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), Java’s’ Remote Method Invocation 
(RMI), Common Object Model (COM), Web services, etc. Grid Services are an 
evolution on existing paradigms (Foster, C. Kesselman, S. Tuecke; 2001). The use 
of open standards such as Open Grid Service Infrastructure (OGSI), extensible 
Mark-up Language (XML) and Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) easily 
allows for heterogeneous platforms to communicate and share computing resources 
within a virtual organisation (VO) context. 
According to Foster, the goal of Grid Computing is “coordinated resource 
sharing and problem solving in dynamic, multi-institutional virtual organizations”. 
Sharing is not just denoted as file exchange or just data sharing, but rather direct 
access to computers, software, data, and other resources, as is required by a range 
of collaborative problem-solving and resource-brokering strategies emerging in 
industry, science, and engineering. (Foster, et al;2001). Furthermore, a set of 
individuals and/or institutions defined by such sharing rules form what is known as 
a virtual organization (VO). Current implementations of grid computing models 
have had great success in a variety of contexts, from the monitoring of natural 
phenomena, to the prediction of market trends among consumers, to name a few. 
However, as the face of modern computing evolves, so do the challenges to the 
underlying technologies that drive it. 
These challenges include: location, connectivity and platform configurations. 
Implicit in these challenges are issues of interoperability, ownership and 
responsibility, security, performance, and reliability. 
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Grid Services is a distributed computing paradigm, built on Web-Services and 
SOAP. The use of XML Web-Services as an underpinning technology – notably the 
WS-* set of specifications for extending SOAP functionality - makes it possible for 
most of these issues to be addressed (Foster, et al; 2001). A Grid is a collection of 
Grid Services, or other Grids logically grouped into a Virtual Organization (VO). 
Grid Services provide a number of services, including processing or computational 
power, database housing, application hosting and sharing. 
The primary focus of this research is to provide a generic and coherent 
security framework, to protect Grid Computing resources and users from hackers 
and intrusion attacks. The process of defining a detailed security strategy for all 
known vulnerabilities, attacks, possible variants on know attacks, and new or 
unknown attacks can be a daunting task; almost impossible, at the rapid rate of 
availability of new hacking tools. It might be more economical to typify the 
hackers’ intentions and generic goals when attacking a system, with a view to 
defining a threat model that can be applied to Grids and Grid services.  
A two-level strategy will be discussed in implementing a defence-in-depth 
strategy for protecting Grids, within the Globus Context. (The Globus Toolkit is 
used for developing Grid Service solutions; see http://www.globus.org/toolkit/). 
The first level is concerned with Grid Services (the lowest level in a Grid), while 
the second level will look at the Grid as a whole and the particular challenges faced 
by Grid designers when implementing them. The STRIDE model (Meier et al; 
2003) for hacker behaviour will be investigated and applied to a risk assessment 
methodology, to provide Grid designers with a framework for developing security 
policies to protect their Grid Services. Additional information will be provided on 
Grids and the Globus Toolkit, as well as a threat-modelling strategy that can be 
applied to Grid computing. 
To summarise, this paper will: 
• Discuss Grid Computing and supporting technologies, such as the 
Globus Toolkit, 
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• Provide an introduction to the STRIDE model for threat-modelling, 
and 
• Describe a holistic security framework for defining security strategies 
in a Grid environment. 
2 GRID COMPUTING 
 
Grid Computing allows large heterogeneous groups to share computing processing 
power, as well as other computing resources. Foster defines a grid as follows: “A 
computational grid is a hardware and software infrastructure that provides 
dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-end 
computational capabilities.” (Foster, 2002). Foster, furthermore, proposes a three-
point checklist, to which grid systems must comply: 
1. Coordinates resources that are not subject to centralized control; 
2. Using standard, open, general-purpose protocols and interfaces; and 
3. To deliver nontrivial qualities of service. 
Grid research is currently focused on standards to facilitate resource 
virtualization and to accommodate intrinsic heterogeneity of resources in 
distributed environments (Stuer, V. Sunderam, J. Broeckhove ; 2004). The concept 
of Grid Services is a natural evolution on Grid Computing.  
Open Grid Services Infrastructure (OSGI) is a specification which defines 
basic mechanisms and interfaces which can be used to build Grid functionality. 
Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA), is an open standard for Grid Services 
implementation. Standard frameworks, based on XML, are being used to describe 
standard service specifications, to allow clients to discover and use services across 
platform, and domain contexts (Ibid). OGSA defines a best practice for 
implementing grid-enabled services.  
The Globus Toolkit (http://www.globus.org/Toolkit/), now in version 4, is an 
open source software framework, designed to implement grid services. Its goal is to 
develop and promote standard grid protocols to enable interoperability and shared 
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infrastructure. A lot of the work done on the Globus project is through the Global 
Grid Forum (GGF). 
 
Figure 1: Timeline diagram of Grid Services, concepts and related standards 
and technologies 
The above diagram shows a logical timeline of standards and technologies 
that support or make up modern Grid Services, the following section will discuss 
the Globus Toolkit in more detail. 
2.1 Globus Toolkit 
 
The Globus Toolkit facilitates an open source implementation of all the protocols 
and primitives defined by Open Grid Service Infrastructure (OSGI), for 
implementing grid services (Sandholm; 2003). The Toolkit consists of a number of 
components, allowing one to develop and implement a grid service. This section 
will introduce these components and briefly discuss them. 
The Globus Toolkit has a layered architecture; high level global services are 
built on a core set of lower level services. At the bottom of the hierarchy, and 
possibly one of the most important services, is the resource management service, 
Globus Resource Allocation Manager, or GRAM; this is responsible for assigning 
as well as de-allocating resources to services. (Foster, 1998). 
In most distributed system architectures, communication plays a key role. The 
Globus Toolkit provides a communication component, NEXUS. NEXUS is a 
library of lower level communication APIs that provide support for higher level 
communication (Foster, 1998). 
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Security is also a major concern in grid implementations. Security needs in 
grids are diverse, including authentication, access control and privacy. Globus 
Security Infrastructure (GSI) is the component within the Toolkit that implements 
security. GSI primarily looks at the problem of authentication, and therefore leaves 
open a large area for future research in the security space (Ibid). 
In a dynamic environment such as in a grid system, the need to be able to 
easily access information about services, components, and applications, in a timely 
fashion, is important. This is in order to allow for adaptation to changes in system 
structure and state. Globus Meta-Computing Directory Service (MDS) stores and 
makes accessible information such as the architecture type; operating system 
version and amount of memory on a computer; network bandwidth and latency; 
available communication;  
Protocols; and the mapping between IP addresses and network devices 
(Foster, 1998). MDS provides tools and APIs to allow for discovery, publishing and 
access information about the structure and state of a grid. 
Health Beat Monitor (HBM) provides simple management services for 
monitoring the health and status of sets of remote processes. The HBM consists of 
several client APIs. A process can register with the HBM, which then acts as a 
data-collection base, periodically receiving “heart-beat” information about a 
process. Other processes can query the HBM for the status of another process. 
Globus also provides Global Access to Secondary Storage (GASS), a 
component that allows programs with access to simple C I\O libraries the ability to 
open, edit and save files on remote computers.   
The final core service in the Globus Toolkit is Globus Executable 
Management (GEM). GEM supports the remote identification, creation and 
location of executables in heterogeneous environments. 
Grid Concepts and the Globus Toolkit were discussed in this section, the 
following section will discuss threat modelling and hacker behaviour. 
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3. Threats 
 
To understand the importance of securing one’s information, it is important to 
understand what are the threats and impact associated with insufficient security 
(Whitman, 2003). A wide range of threats exist. These threats are unique for the 
various parts of a grid, although the attacker’s (generic) goals might be the same 
(Meier, Mackman, Vasireddy, Dunner, Escamilla, Murukan; 2003). Knowing how 
and why a hacker can attack an information system is a good starting point to 
identifying threats to an organization’s information assets. 
 
3.1 Attackers goals 
 
There are a wide range of possible attacks, and further fine-grained variations on 
these attacks. The best method to classify threats to one’s system is to identify the 
hacker’s goals when performing an attack. STRIDE is the acronym for an approach 
to categorize different threat types (Ibid): 
• Spoofing - The hacker’s goal when spoofing is to try gain access to the 
system by mimicking legitimate user-credentials or network traffic. 
• Tampering – This is the unauthorized altering of information, while it is in 
transit between two computers. 
• Repudiation – Prevents administrators from knowing if users (legitimate or 
not), have performed an action. 
• Information disclosure – This is the unwanted exposure of private 
information. 
• Denial of Service – This is the process of making services un-available to 
users. 
• Escalation of privileges – This attack occurs when a user of limited 
privileges assumes the roll of a privileged user, in order to steal, corrupt, or 
deny access to information asset. 
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3.2 Hacker’s methodology 
 
Microsoft (Ibid) identifies the basic attack approach adopted by hackers, this 
approach defines generic steps a hacker will need to perform in order to complete a 
successful attack; not all steps are required in every instance. The steps in the 
hacker’s methodology are listed below: 
1. Survey and assess - Survey and assess is the initial stage of the hacking 
process. The hacker will try to learn of possible servers and services on the 
network. The hacker will then try to find possible weakness and exploits, to 
try and gain access to the target machine. 
2. Exploit and penetrate - Once the hacker completes the survey phase, the 
next step is to exploit and penetrate the target. 
3. Escalate privileges - Upon completing the attack and delivering the 
payload, the hacker will then attempt to create a backdoor to access the 
desired server. Immediately an attempt will be made to escalade privileges, 
specifically to administrator. 
4. Maintain access - Once the attacker has administrative privileges, they will 
try and make further access easier and try to hide his or her tracks. A 
common method of making back door access possible is to plant back-door 
applications. Hackers will often attempt to clear event logs at this stage. 
5. Deny service - If the attacker is not successful in his or her attack, they will 
try launch a Denial of Service attack (DoS), to deny others use of the 
service.  
 
 
Figure 2. Steps in a typical attack (Meier et al, 2003) 
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In a Grid Community, nodes (clients, servers, brokers), messages and 
message pathways are exposed to a range of threats.  
4. Holistic Grid Security Framework 
 
Grids can be logically divided into two levels, based on security needs and 
challenges. The first layer is the local grid service layer, which is concerned with a 
data or computational grid service as a separate local entity below the common grid 
infrastructure in the VO (Virtual Organization) context. The second layer is the 
Common Grid layer. This layer consists of all GT grid services. A single VO can 
span countries, or the globe. 
One of the biggest problems faced by Grid designers is implementing 
authentication and authorization between Grid Services or sites. Each site may have 
its own local security policy, and will make use of a different set of technologies 
(Foster; 1998b). This includes security issues when crossing trust domains and grid-
to-grid security issues, such as single-sign on authentication and authorization. We 
will first look at the lowest level, the local grid services that make up a grid. 
Consider the following diagram: 
 
 
Figure 3: Logical view of a Grid 
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In the above diagram, the core represents a local Grid Service. The outer layer 
represents aspects and challenges of a Grid in a VO (virtual organization) context. 
Local Grid services can be divided into four logical security layers: 
Local (Grid Service) level: 
• Underlying platforms and runtimes: Platform security is based on 
the hardware and software platforms the Grid Service is hosted on, i.e. 
INTEL x86, SPARC, etc. running LINUX, UNIX or Windows 
operating systems. Runtimes dictate the security runtime environment; 
the grid software is typically hosted in e.g. JAVA or .NET. 
• Communications protocols and technologies: Service components 
can communicate over a variety of mediums and protocols. The most 
commonly used communication protocol is TCP/IP, over variety of 
mediums, broadband, wireless, VPNs, etc. Each communication 
mechanism involves an appropriate local security implementation, e.g. 
IPSec. 
• Network: the network “cloud” between (local and) grid participants, 
and (local and) grid services in a virtual organization is, fortunately, 
commonly based on TCP/IP, with interoperability on LAN and WAN 
interfaces being provided for through hardware and software 
gateways. 
• Implicit in the actual service components will be additional security 
measures such as .NET strong names (with embedded credentials) and 
role-based security at the component/class/method level. 
The Common Grid Layer Challenges: 
• Authentication: A variety of authentication challenges are presented 
when multiple sites or grid participants have varying security policies 
and authentication implementations. Identification and authentication 
credentials have to be persisted from the common layer to local layer. 
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• Access Control (Authorization): The challenge of maintaining 
access control assertions down to the local components is obviously 
great as common policies and interoperable implementations are 
critical factors. Hence, Web Services standards, such as WS-Security 
and WS-Policy are crucial to the GT framework. 
• Broker: An abstracted software component, acting as an intermediary 
between parties, is the backbone of Grid Services integration. It 
deploys GT (or equivalent) middleware, common security and 
interoperability policies and implementations. This layer provides 
access to the local grid service and associated services (database, 
application hosting, processing, etc). It uses interoperable standards, 
such as XML and SOAP. It uses GT mechanisms for mapping 
security credentials and interoperability mechanisms from the 
Common Grid Layer to the Local Grid Layer. 
Next, Grid Services security will be considered in terms of the STRIDE 
approach discussed earlier. 
4.1 Grid Services Security and STRIDE 
 
The STRIDE model for threat modelling was introduced previously, as well as a 
hacker methodology for attacking information systems.  
• Grid services have unique security needs, largely due to their open nature 
and interconnectivity. (Grid services are largely un-standardised, in terms of 
underlying platforms and communications technology. As discussed, they 
are often built on a variety of hardware, software, and operating system 
platforms, as well as a range of possible communication protocols and 
technologies. (Baker, et al; 2000). However, the common layer is, typically, 
standardized in terms of using open standards, such as XML and SOAP, and 
the Globus Toolkit (a de facto standard for building Grid services). This 
layer is standardized in order to facilitate integration of underlying 
heterogeneous platforms and technologies.   
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In the previous section it was determined that there are several generic hacker 
goals, as well as a set of generic steps a hacker will follow to attack a system. The 
following table shows what goals are typically applicable to each particular layer, 
defined above, in a Grid service VO. 
 
 Spoofing Tampering Repudiation Information 
Disclosure 
Denial of 
Service 
(DoS) 
Escalation 
of 
privileges 
Underlying 
platform and 
runtimes 
X  X  X X 
Communication 
protocols and 
technologies 
X X   X  
Local Grid 
Service X   X X X 
Broker: Globus 
Toolkit and 
supporting 
standards 
X  X X X X 
Figure 4: table of typical goals of a hacker when attacking each layer of a grid 
 
The above table can be used as a generic basis for developing a local security 
strategy to protect a Grid Services Deployment. The details of implementation are 
beyond the scope of this paper. However consider the following scenario: 
Tampering is a risk associated with the communications layer of a grid. A 
typical method of tampering with network traffic is a “man-in-the middle” attack, 
in which a hacker will intercept traffic in transit from one node, read the contents 
and alter it, then pass it on to the intended recipient. A number of controls can be 
implemented to combat this threat, such as encryption. On a high level, we have 
determined that the grid implementation will require encryption to protect 
information in transit. When deciding on a Grid-wide encryption strategy for 
information in transit, we can determine if IPSec will be used, or more commonly 
in this instance, encrypted SOAP packets at layer 7 (of the OSI reference model). 
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4.2 Grid Security Implementation Scenario 
 
Grids require standard security functions, such as, authentication, access control, 
integrity, privacy, and non-repudiation (Foster, 1998b). This is difficult to 
implement in a Grid-wide Community, due to a number of factors. VOs (Virtual 
Organizations) can be made up of a number of diverse geographically disperse 
sites, implementing non-compatible local security policies\technologies. Consider 
the following scenario: 
User-A at Site-A starts an analysis program that sends code to be executed on 
Site-B, but Site-B requires a dataset on Site-C to perform the analysis. The 
application at Site-A contacts a broker at Site-D to obtain idle resources needed to 
process the task at hand. The Broker then initiates communications with sites E,F,G 
in order to complete the task at hand. These sites will need to maintain 
communication between them (possibly using a multicast protocol), as well as the 
broker, the original site (requesting site), and the user.   
 
 
Figure 5: Example of large scale distributed computing environment 
The above scenario depicts many distinctive characteristics of the Grid 
Computing environment (Foster, 199b): 
• The user population is large and dynamic.  
• The resource pool is large and dynamic. 
• A computation (or processes created by a computation) may acquire, start 
processes on, and release resources dynamically during its execution.  
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• The processes constituting a computation may communicate by using a 
variety of mechanisms. Low level communications (e.g. TCP/IP sockets) 
can be created and destroyed dynamically during program execution. 
• Resources may require different authentication and authorization 
mechanisms and policies, which we will have limited ability to change. In 
the above example, this was illustrated this by showing the local access 
control policies that apply at different sites. These include Kerberos, Secure 
Socket Library (SSL) and Secure Shell (SSH).  
• An individual user will be associated with different local name spaces, 
credentials, or accounts, at different sites, for the purposes of accounting 
and access control. 
• Resources and users may be located in different countries. 
There is need to provide security solutions to grid users that can allow 
computations, such as in the above described scenario. These solutions must allow 
for the co-ordination of diverse access control policies and to allow them to operate 
securely in heterogeneous environments (Foster, 199b). 
In order to achieve a global security infrastructure within a VO, a broker can 
be used to facilitate communications, authentication and authorization at a central 
site.  The implementation of various services and middleware can allow for this. 
Grid users are provided two sets of credentials, one applicable to their local 
security policy and another to a global Grid security policy. A broker service can be 
used to maintain a table of mappings for user credentials, which allows for 
comparison to a global security policy for access to resources (Foster, 199b). This 
mapping of user credentials can provide a transparent single sign-on to the user 
when interacting with the grid.  
1. A user provides the credentials needed to log onto the grid. 
2. The user initiates a process that requires remote grid resources. 
3. The user’s grid credentials are tested against a global access-control policy. 
4. The user’s rights to that resource are determined.  
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5. If they have sufficient rights, the grid initiates the communication and 
provides that grid service with the correct level authentication.          
This sort of policy can be implemented using a group policy structure. The 
structure consists of several elements: 
• Resource  
• Users 
• Groups 
• Privilege 
A resource is defined, groups are linked to a resource, and one group can 
contain many users. A group then has a privilege to access the resource defined, 
one resource can have many groups linked to it. 
This simple paradigm can allow for complex authorization structures though 
out the grid and can cater for scalability. However there are some complexities 
involved in the implementation and maintenance of the proposed structure. 
Middleware can be used to reduce the complexities of maintaining the proposed 
structure, however this falls outside the scope of this research. 
A holistic grid security structure was investigated, and it was found grids can 
be divided into two logical layers, the grid layer and grid service layer. Each of 
these defined layers has their own security needs. A framework to implement a 
security strategy was described. 
5. Conclusion 
 
A layered approach to securing grids was introduced in this paper. Grids provide a 
powerful mechanism for collaboration and sharing data and processing resources. 
The Globus Toolkit was briefly discussed, the Toolkit provides Grid designers a 
standardised set of software tools and libraries for implementing grid services, and 
is considered the de facto standard for implementing grid services. STRIDE was 
discussed as a threat model for categorizing hacker’s action and behaviours, based 
on the outcome of the attack performed or the hacker’s goal in attacking a Grid.  
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The anatomy of a Grid and Grid Services were discussed. It was suggested 
that Grids can be divided into two logical layers, the common and local layers, each 
with its own security needs. The lower of the two layers the local layer is concerned 
with security at a single site. The higher level, or the common layer, is concerned 
with “global” Grid security issues, including authentication and authorization 
between Grid Services sites.  
A security strategy taking into account all possible attacks and hacks against a 
Grid is a daunting task. It was proposed here that STRIDE be used by Grid 
designers as a basis to develop security strategies to protect Grid Services. Each 
category of STRIDE was found to be applicable to aspects of a Grid Service, 
providing Grid designers a suitable framework for developing tailored Grid security 
strategies. 
A brokered approach for providing authentication and authorization services 
on a common grid layer was discussed. Although this approach provides a means to 
solve the problem of single-sign authentication, grid-wide authorization, etc. It does 
require the use of Globus (or other standard) middleware. The complexities of 
implementing and maintaining a brokered approach provide an area for further 
research. 
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